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I.
INTRODUCTION
In every American election there are two acts of choice:
two periods of contest. The first is the selection of the
candidate within the party, by the party. The other is the
struggle between the parties for the place. Frequently the
former is more important, more keenly fought over than the
latter.— James Bryce, The American Commonwealth.
Robert A. Taft was one of the most prominent politicians of his
era.

He was known to congressional colleagues, the press, and millions

of Americans as Mr. Republican.

Contemporaries within the Senate

considered him to be among the greatest men who had ever sat in
that chamber, for in 1937 he was elected, along with Henry Clay,
John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster, and Robert Lafollette of Wisconsin,
to the newly-founded Senate Hall of Fame.'*'

And yet, for all his

honors and talents, Taft never received his party's nomination for
the presidency.
The purpose of this paper will be to determine why Taft never
received the prize he seemingly deserved.

It will focus on three

contests in which Taft was a possible nominee— 1940, 1948, and 1952 —
to see what went wrong.

The paper will begin with a brief examination

of Taft's career before his entry into the Senate in 1939, and then
proceed to the three aforementioned nominating campaigns, to see
what information they offer about Taft, power in the Republican Party,
and American presidential nominating politics.

^Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966),
p. 82.

1
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It is necessary to point out at the start that a few factors
were common to each of Taft's three defeats.

First, he suffered

from a lack of substantial support from Eastern delegates to the
three conventions; second, Taft had the support of large numbers
of what can be called ’’Old Guard Republicans” ; and third,
(especially in 1948 and 1952) many Republicans concluded that Taft
was not a good vote getter, in short, that he could not win.

Along

with similarities, however, oiher factors varied in the three
campaigns.

Therefore, each campaign must be discussed separately.

The chapters will be arranged chronologically rather than topically.
Taft was b o m in 1889, in Cincinnati, Ohio.

His education

consisted of attending Taft School in Connecticut, Yale University,
and Harvard Law School.

After practicing law in Cincinnati and

working with Herbert Hoover on sending food supplies to Europe
during World War I, he entered politics in 1920, first as a
precinct worker and then as a member of the lower House of the Ohio
Legislature.

Taft served in the Legislature from 1921 to 1926 and

for part of his last term was Speaker of the House.

He did not run

for reelection in 1926, but instead returned to private law practice.
For the next twelve years, he was, with the exception of one
term in the Ohio Senate (1931-32), primarily occupied by this legal
work.

In 1938, Taft left his firm, Taft, Stetinius, and Hollister,

to run for a seat in the United States Senate.

After winning in the

Republican primary he defeated Robert Bulkley, the Democratic incumbent,
in the general election, and thus gained the position which he held
until his death in 1953.
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Taft rose so rapidly in the Senate that in 1940 he received
377 votes for the presidential nomination on the fifth ballot of
the Republican Convention.

This total was only good enough for

second place, and therefore not enough to stop the nomination of
Wendell Willkie.

Though his reelection to the Senate in 1944 was by

a narrow margin, he continued his rise to leadership among Republican
Senators.

When in 1946 the Republican Party gained control of both

houses of Congress, Taft became the spokesman for the majority in
the Senate on domestic affairs.

Among his accomplishments at this

time was the Taft-Hartley labor law.
Taft was ready for a second attempt at the presidential
nomination in 1948.

Hopeful that his reputation and the record of

the 80th Congress would carry him to victory, he spent considerable
time and money to gain this end.

Again, he lost, this time to

Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York.

Dewey was defeated by

President Truman in the election, and so were enough Republican
Senators and Congressmen to swing Congress to the Democrats.

Taft

was worried about his chances for reelection in 1950, because many
labor unions were

out to punish him for "Taft-Hartley."

He need

not have worried, for he won the election by a: substantial margin.
This victory, combined with the defeats of Willkie and Dewey, made
him the logical choice for the presidential nomination in 1952.

For

a third time he was defeated, this time by a political newcomer,
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a very bitter convention.
Eisenhower, of course, was elected; and the Republicans had a
narrow majority in both houses of the 83rd Congress.

Taft, for all
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too short a time, became both in fact and in name, Senate majority
leader, a role which lasted •until July 1953, when he died of cancer.
Taft's career was eventful and successful in nearly all respects.
This provides all the more reason to attempt to discover why this
remarkable politician was unable to receive the highest honor his
countrymen could give: election to the presidency of the United States.
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II.
THE PREPARATION: 1839-1938
"One with a family name has a lot to
live up to."— Robert A. Taft.
Any individual who wants to run for the presidency cannot expect
success unless he has qualities which bring him to the voters’
attention.

A serious presidential bid begins, not with an announce

ment of candidacy, but with the start of a public career.

A candidate

for high office continually faces the danger of having some mistake
in his early career thrown back at him in the campaign.
The style of a presidential campaign often is determined by
attitudes and characteristics of personality acquired before and
during an individual's public career.

These qualities seem

especially striking in the career of Robert Taft.

Many of them played

a role in shaping the type of presidential politics in which he was
later to engage.

It is necessary therefore to consider some of the

characteristics gained in his youth and early political experience.
Probably most important among the forces which shaped Taft's
future career was the Taft family.

His grandfather, Alfonzo Taft,

had held two cabinet positions, Secretary of War and Attorney General,
and two positions in the Foreign Service— Minister to Austria-Hungary
and Minister to Russia, before his death in 1891.^

One of the sons of

Alfonzo, the father of Robert, William Howard Taft, carried on the
tradition of public service established by his father.

He was a

1 Stephen Hess, American Political Dynasties, (New York: Doubleday,
1966), pp. 304-05.
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respected Judge in Ohio, and in 1889, the year Robert was born,
accepted appointment as Solicitor General of the United States.

This

was only the first step in a national career which would later see
him as President and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
The Taft name would help Robert in his later political career,
and do much to inspire his conservative, Republican ideals.

But the

future Senator soon discovered that his name alone was not enough.
Discussing the matter soon after entering the Senate in 1939, he
stated that the advantage of a family name:
supplies the impetus which gives a man his start, but that
impetus does not last forever. Although the start is made
it is only by his own efforts that a man can keep going,
and one with a family name has a lot to live up to.^
Robert did not minimize the contribution made by his father.

He

told an interviewer in 1952, "the fact that father was President and
Chief Justice of the United States was a tremendous help and
3

inspiration in my public career."
The tradition of public service was not the only gift handed
down by the Taft family.

Almost as important was the desire to excel

at everything, a desire which Robert carried on throughout his school
days.

He was at the head of his class at the Horace Taft School, Yale

and Harvard Law School.

The drive to excel was one of his outstanding

2
Noel George Rapp, "The Political Speaking of Senator Robert A.
Taft: 1889-1953", (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: Purdue University,
1955), p. 19.
3
Hess, p. 310.
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characteristics.

Once he believed he had mastered a subject, and

made up his mind about it, he would not compromise on fundamental
principles.

In later years this quality would cause Paul Porter,

former head of the Office of Price Administration, to say, "He
(Taft) has the best mind in Washington, until he makes it up."^
This trait would have far-reaching consequences in years to come.
And, as shall be seen later, it may have been a factor in causing
him to lose his party’s presidential nomination.
Another concept, not inherited but shared with the rest of the
family was Taft’s Republicanism.

Taft had graduated from Yale,

when in 1912, he saw his father denied a second term as President
because Theodore Roosevelt and Progressive Republicans bolted the
G.O.P. convention and founded the Bull Moose Party, with T.R. as its
candidate.

The campaign helped teach Taft the importance of

supporting the party's regular organization.
united, the outcome might have been different.

Had the party been
Reform, Taft believed,

must come from within the Party’ insurgents and bolters were anathema.
Taft's first opportunity to show his Republicanism in public
office came in 1920 when he was elected to the Ohio Legislature.
This body was dominated by Republicans, but there were factions
involving urban-rural differences.

The young legislator seems to

have represented his constituency, Cincinnati, for his votes were
much the same as those of other Republicans from the Cincinnati area.^

4 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "His Eyes have Seen the Glory,"
Colliers 119: (February 22, 1947), 13.
5 Pauline Helen Isaacson, "Robert Alfonzo Taft; an Assessment
of a Persuader," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: University of
Minnesota, 1956), pp. 128-33.
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An anecdote from those early days points to another controversial
quality: Taft's shyness.

Friends recall that when he first entered

the Legislature in 1921, he always ate his meals alone at a Columbus
hotel, while other legislators pushed their trays in a cafeteria.
One of them, who realized that Taft might possibly be shy rather than
snobbish, asked if he would not like to eat with the rest of his
colleagues.

Taft's response was, "Do you think it will be all right?"
g

From that time on he always ate with the other legislators.

Taft

might not have been outgoing, but his ability to master a subject and
his capacity for hard work allowed him to make friendships which would
last and which would be politically valuable.
It was clear to some who served with Taft in the Legislature in
the early twenties that he could go far in his political career.
In 1925 he was elected Party floor leader.

His name was placed in

nomination by Representative O.C. Gray of Harrison County, who was
happy to further a career which would rival that of "his great father."^
The next year Taft was elected Speaker of the Ohio House.
Taft's years in the Legislature are notable not only for party
regularity, but also for his position on questions involving civil
liberties, some of which, it should be pointed out, were at variance
with other Republicans at the Capitol.

Most courageous of these

was the stand taken by Taft on a bill, in 1925, which would have
required ten verses of the Bible to be read daily in every school in

g

Isaacson, p. 130.
^ Ibid., p. 131; James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A
Biography of Robert A. Taft, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1972), p. 96.
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the state.

This bill was supported by the Ku Klux Klan, then a

potent force in Ohio as well as many other parts of the country.

He

opposed the bill because, in his view, it was unconstitutional and
violated civil liberties.

His opposition was in vain, however, as

0
the bill passed both Houses of the Legislature.
Though Taft chose not to run for reelection in 1926, he did
not withdraw from politics completely, for along with his brother
Charles, he supported efforts to reform the city government.

The

Republican machine which was running Cincinnati at the time was,
if not corrupt, very inefficient.

Money was lacking, and city

services were not keeping pace with a rapid population growth.

The

Party boss, Rudolph Hynika, spent most of his time in New York.

As

a result of this poor state of affairs, many prominent citizens
organized a reform movement, the leader of which was Murray Seasongood, an idealistic lawyer who had formed the Cincinnatus Association
in 1920.
The movement rapidly achieved success, and by 1925, Seasongood
had been elected Mayor, and the "Queen City" had a city manager form
of government.

9

The "Charterists," as they came to be called,

remained an important force in Cincinnati politics for years after
the reforms were made.
Taft was troubled by the reform movement.

Though he held no

public office, he used his prestige to work out compromises between
the Charterists and the regular Republicans.

To be sure, the

0
Patterson, pp. 100-01.
^ Ibid., pp. 121-26.
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10
machine was inefficient, but Taft believed that it could only be
changed by efforts within the Republican Party.
overly optimistic.

This belief was

The Hynika machine was not very flexible, and

Taft's try at compromise was not completely successful.

In fact,

Charles Taft ran as a Charterist candidate for Prosecuting Attorney,
and was elected over a Republican candidate.
Taft's support of the regular organization provides a classic
example of his orthodox Republicanism and disapproval of insurgents.
It also suggests his loyalty to those who had helped him.

The

Hynika organization had endorsed him for three terms in the Legis
lature.

His loyalty to his friends and political allies would appear

throughout his political career.

10

Taft did not seek public office again until 1930 when he was
elected to the Ohio Senate.

The intervening years were spent

working for his law firm and in various cultural and civic activities
involving Cincinnati.

He attended the Republican National Convention

of 1928 as a delegate at large and supported the nomination (and later
election) of Herbert Hoover.

I® Patterson, p. 127.
^ Taft's support of Hoover was one instance in which he was
not in full agreement with the Ohio Organization. He worked to
gain Hoover the nomination in 1920 when the Organization was suppor
ting Senator Warren Harding and General Leonard Wood. The attempt
failed.
In 1928 Taft led a slate of delegates against favorite son
Senator Frank Willis, an event which caused much bitterness among
Ohio Republicans. Willis died before the convention, which allowed
all factions to unite behind Hoover. See: Patterson, pp. 96, 141;
Herbert Mengert, Cincinnati Enquirer, 1 February 1948, p. 38:
Arthur Krock, New York Times, 10 February 1948, p. 22.
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Taft had come to the conclusion by 1930 that he could again
seek public office.

The political climate seemed right for

achieving a goal which he had unsuccessfully sought for six years
in the lower House: tax reform.

In the Senate he maneuvered

skillfully enough to gain passage of a tax reform bill which the
Governor signed into law.

The law was controversial, and according

to Taft was one of the causes, along with the deepening depression
and the strength of the Democrats, which led to his defeat for
reelection in 1932,
election.

12

the only time he was to lose in a general

He nonetheless felt that he had been right in seeking

tax reform.

He never shrank from controversy during his career,

a characteristic which would affect his chances to gain a presiden
tial nomination.
This defeat did not affect Taft's career seriously.

There is,

in fact, evidence that he did not want to go back to Columbus anyway
in 1933.

The Republicans would have a reduced number in the

Legislature and Taft believed that he would either have to make
himself agreeable to Governor George White or be a disruptive force
within the legislative body and he was happy with neither of these
courses of action.

He would spend the better part of the next six

The tax reform bill included taxes on tobacco, automobile
licenses, and for the first time, intangible property. The intang
ible property tax never brought in the revenue which Taft believed
it would because the depression cut investments and dividends.
Another controversial feature of the Bill was the distribution
plan which required that counties which collected more than their
quota of tax revenue should turn over the excess money to poorer
counties. This clause was overturned by a Court decision. By
supporting the Bill, Taft seems to have lost votes in the 1932
election. See Patterson, pp. 133-40.
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years working in his law firm.

13

By this time Taft was in a strong position with the Republican
organization in Ohio.

As the campaign for the Republican Presidential

nomination opened in 1936, and as there seemed to be a division in the
Party between progressive and conservative forces, the organization
asked Taft to become a favorite son around whom Ohio Republicans
supporting Frank Knox and Alfred M. Landon could unite.

By this

means the party hoped to keep the other candidate, Senator William E.
Borah of Idaho, from capturing control of the Ohio delegation at
the Cleveland convention.

Taft campaigned actively throughout the

state and when the votes were counted had won forty-seven of Ohio's
fifty-two delegates.

14

By convention time Landon had so outdistanced his rivals that
both the Taft and Borah groups within the Ohio delegation supported
him, and thus helped the Kansan to gain an easy first ballot
nomination.^
within

Taft had again showed his ability to work with and

the Republican organization.

All his efforts were, however,

to be of little immediate use, since Landon was beaten badly by
President Roosevelt in the election of 1936. The publicity which Taft gained by campaigning in the primary
helped him in two ways.

First, it gave him an outlet for criticism

*■3 Patterson, p. 140.
14

Frank A. Burd, "Robert Alfonzo Taft and the American Under
standing of Politics," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: University
of Chicago, 1969), pp. 31-2; William S. White, The Taft Story,
(New York: Harper, 1954), p. 21; Cleveland Plain Dealer. 14 January
1940, *p. 18.
^

Burd, p. 32; Patterson, pp. 154-55.
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of the New Deal, and second, it allowed voters statewide to
find out where he stood— publicity which would be of use in 1938
when he finally decided to run for the United States Senate.
This post had been a goal for Taft for several years, but he had
not run.
The Senate seat which Taft sought in 1938 was held by a
Democrat, Robert Bulkley.

Before he could face Bulkley, though,

he had to win the Republican nomination.

This was no easy task,

for Arthur Day, a popular Judge in the Cleveland Municipal Court,
was his opponent.
The primary campaign pitted two sharply contrasting candidates
against each other.

Day was outgoing and seemed to enjoy the back-

slapping, hand-shaking, and baby-kissing thought to be necessary
in a political campaign.

Never fond of this method of campaigning,

Taft preferred to appeal to the intellect of the voter.
contrast was geographic.

A second

Day was from northern Ohio, while Taft

was from the southern part of the state. ^
The voters of Ohio liked the southern candidate better, for
they gave Taft a margin of about 77,000 votes.

Three months later

they elected him by 170,000 votes over the incumbent, Bulkley.^
The preparation was now complete.

By winning the election,

Taft was in a position to enter national politics.

He had learned

and experienced much in his first forty-nine years; and he was

^

Patterson, pp. 161-69 passim.

^ The vote in the primary was: Taft, 322,270; Day, 245,949.
In the general election the vote was: Taft, 1,257,412; Bulkley,
1,086,815. See Patterson, pp. 172, 178.
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about to begin the fifteen years of his life for which he would be
best remembered.
What can be said, in summary, about the preparation of Robert Taft
for gaining the presidential nomination?
Taft was steeped in tradition.

Several points stand out.

He tried to follow the example of his

grandfather and father by acquiring a deep respect for, and loyalty
to, the regular Republican organization.

In turn this organization

showed, for the most part, a great loyalty to him, and would give him
a base of support when he decided to seek the presidency.
Taft had also come to the realization that the Republican Party
had to offer definite alternatives if it wanted to be successful.
He believed that it was necessary to attack the Democratic Party and
its policies, which of course, meant the New Deal.

Partisan

politics, he thought, were valuable and necessary, and he never lost
this view.
There were other qualities which Taft had acquired in his first
forty-nine years.

He did not like to campaign.

He would rarely

compromise on matters involving principle— qualities which, as shall
be seen, did more harm than good in his attempts for the presidency.
But as his first term in the Senate began, they had not proved a
handicap.
And so as 1939 opened Robert Taft had assumed the position which
he would hold for the rest of his life.
from Ohio and he had a familiar name.

He was the junior Senator
Would this new position be

another step toward the presidency?
The election of 1938 suggested that Taft had possibilities as
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a vote-getter— an asset which at that time was greatly lacking in
the Republican Party.

It is no wonder then that one reporter wrote

"Sky Farm (the Taft home near Cincinnati) may yet be a summer
White House.

18

Patterson, p. 178.
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III.
THE FIRST EFFORT: PHILADELPHIA 1940

•'Out of tne hearts of these patriotic Americans came
the chant: 'we want Willkie.'"— Joseph W. Martin, Jr.
Robert Taft was elected to the Senate at a time when even a
first-term Senator could rise quickly within the Republican Party.
There were only a handful of Republican Senators on Capitol Hill,
and these were split into groups which would give varying amounts
of support to Franklin Roosevelt and his policies.

Taft was

welcomed by that group of Republicans opposed to much of the work
of the Roosevelt administration.

As a representative of this

group he made his first real effort to gain the Republican Party's
nomination in 1940.

The problem was to win over other factions

within the Party.
As Taft entered his first term in the Senate, he and other
Republicans could be optimistic about prospects for 1940.

The

G.O.P., in 1938, had elected fourteen new governors, increased
their membership in the House of Representatives from 89 to 170
members, and increased by eight the number of Republican Senators.*.
If the votes of twenty-eight of the thirty-three states which had
elected governors were added together, the Republicans would receive
53.1 percent of the votes cast.

If these votes could be held in

* Donald Bruce Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell
Willkie, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960), p. 30;
Warren Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, (Englewood Cliffs N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 26.
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the presidential election, reasoned some Republican National Committee
officials, the result would be 365 votes in the Electoral College—
more than enough to elect a Republican to the presidency.

2

The Republicans also could point to the fact that a $900,000
debt, incurred in the futile efforts for Alf Landon in 1936, had
been paid.

3

A war chest free of debt would be valuable for the

election of 1940— another encouraging sign.
No less encouraging was the intra-party disagreement among the
Democrats.

Franklin Roosevelt had tried in 1938 to get rid of

Senators who were not as sympathetic as they might have been to his
New Deal program.

He met with varying success, but the potential

for disunity was still present, and if it materialized, the
Republicans would be all too happy to take advantage of it.

4

Related to this lack of Democratic unity was the question of
whether Franklin Roosevelt would break precedent and run for a
third term.

If he did the Republicans could charge dictatorship

in the making; if he did not, the G.O.P. might profit from the
Democrats' need to run someone less well known than the President.
Unfortunately, the Republicans had problems of their own.
The defeat in 1936 left the Party with many views as to how to
regain a dominant role in political affairs.

Alf Landon, though

not wanting to be considered for nomination in 1940, was still

Johnson, p. 30.
3

Henry 0. Evjen, "The Willkie Campaign: an Unfortunate Chapter
in Republican Leadership," Journal of Politics, 14: 241.
^ Johnson, pp. 28-9.
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titular leader of the Party, and determined to play a part.

He

believed that the Party could not take a course which would lead it
back to policies of the 19tn century.

He hoped that the Republicans

would nominate a moderate and keep the Party moving forward."*
Other men wanted to attack the New Deal on all fronts.

Former

President Herbert Hoover and John D. M. Hamilton, the. Republican
National Chairman, were vehement in their denunciation of New Deal
domestic and foreign policies.

Others, such as Senators Arthur H.

Vandenberg of Michigan, Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, and William E.
Borah of Idaho, used most of their energies to attack Roosevelt's
foreign policies.

While critical of much of Roosevelt's domestic

program, they preferred to work to improve, not demolish, the
New Deal.**
As the time for the election of 1940 drew near, the Republican
Party found itself stronger than it had been in 1936.

To present

a united front, compromises would have to be made, and a strong
candidate would have to be found.

There were many Republicans who

believed that they would run effectively against the Democrats.
The first candidate to attract significant attention in the
public opinion polls was Senator Vandenberg.

In office since 1928,

he was considered one of the Republican leaders in the Senate.
In 1936 he was offered the vice-presidential nomination by Alf Landon,

^ Donald R. McCoy, Landon of Kansas, (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1966), p. 423.
** Herbert S. Parmet and Marie B. Hecht, Never Again: a President
Runs for a Third Term, (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 67; Paul Mallon,
Cleveland Plain Dealer, 27 February 1940, p. 8; Johnson, pp. 26-28.
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but had asked the convention not to support him.

This decision was

probably wise, though it did not endear him to Landon who still
g

exercised influence within the Party.
Others in the Party had objections to Vandenberg.

Some believed

that he would be too controversial; he had taken definite stands on
too many issues.

He supported protective tariffs in the age of the

Hull Reciprocal Trade Agreement.

In addition, he was too pro-business

to suit liberal thinkers within the Party.
remained a contender for the nomination.

Vandenberg nonetheless

9

Senator Vandenberg was not the only man from Michigan being
considered for the nomination: there was also Thomas E. Dewey who
was born in Owosso.

Though Dewey’s reputation was made in

New York City, his rural, midwest background would help win support
of convention delegates in 1940.

He gained attention for racket-

busting as New York County District Attorney, and had become so
popular throughout the city that some polling places in Brooklyn,
not within Dewey's jurisdiction, had to post signs telling voters
that "Thomas E. Dewey is not running for office in this County.

^ Cleveland Plain Dealer, 11 February 1940, p. 17; Official
Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-first Republican National
Convention, (New York: Tenny Press, 1936), p. 194.
g

Johnson, p. 28; McCoy, p. 428, gives an alternative cause
for Landon*s mistrust of Vandenberg in 1940. Cleveland Plain Dealer,
27 February 1940, p. 8.
9

Parmet and Hecht, p. 69. This was a very different Vandenberg
from the Senator who supported the bi-partisan foreign policy of the
Truman administration.

^

Ibid., p. 66.
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It is no wonder that the Republican State Committee decided to
support Dewey for Governor of New York in 1938.
Dewey had some factors working against him.

He was only

thirty-six, and his inexperience was used as an issue by his opponent
Herbert H- Lehman, the incumbent Governor, and other Democrats.
He was also handicapped when Fiorello LaGuardia, liberal Republican
Mayor of New York City, came out for Lehman.

In short, Dewey's

candidacy was a long shot.^
Nevertheless, Dewey made an impressive showing in 1938.

Out of

a total vote of 4.8 million, Dewey was defeated by only about 64,000
votes.

He carried all counties in the state with the exception of

those of New York City and Albany, the state Capitol.
Dewey's success caused a great stir.

12

Roosevelt had carried

New York State by well over one million votes in 1936.

Two years

later this young attorney from Michigan had come along and given
Lehman, a well respected politician, something of a scare.

To balance

this positive view, Republican leaders had to take several facts into
consideration.

If he were elected President in 1940, he would be

^ Stanley Walker, Dewey, an American of this Century, (New York:
Magraw-Hill, 1944), pp. 99-100.
12

The ballot in New York allows the candidate to run under more
than one party label. In 1938 Lehman was endorsed by the American
Labor Party, and received more than 400,000 votes from this source.
Dewey was supported by the Independent Progressive Party, but only
received 24,000 votes under this banner. It is therefore interesting
to note that Dewey received more Republican votes than those cast
under the Democratic label for Lehman. This may help to account for
the enthusiasm shown for Dewey in the next two years. See: Walker,
pp. 104-05. Pannet and Hecht, p. 66, gives a summary of the vote in
New York City and the rest of the state.
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only thirty-eight years old— by far the youngest man ever elected
to the presidency.

When this fact was added to a worsening world

situation (the Munich Conference took place in September, 1938)
some question had to be raised about his lack of experience in
world affairs.
The second problem was that Dewey had never held national
office.

This obstacle had been overcome by only two former

presidents, Ulysses Grant and Zachary Taylor.

What had Dewey done

to be ranked with these two war heroes?
Those who supported Dewey pointed to his energy and skill in
prosecuting such corrupt politicians as Tammany leader James Hines.
As one supporter, Ruth Hanna McCormick Simmes, put it: "Tom Dewey
is...an able administrator as well as a two-fisted fighter."

13

The prevailing attitude, both of Party leaders and of rank and file
Republicans, was to wait and see.

In February 1939, Dewey came

out first in a survey conducted by George Gallup in which
twenty-seven percent of those Republicans who had an opinion endorsed
Dewey as their choice for President.

At that time only forty

percent of the Republicans who were surveyed had made up their minds.
This wait and see attitude reappeared two months later when
leaders of several Northeastern states, including New York, insisted
that Dewey offer alternatives to the New Deal on economic issues.
These leaders planned to remain uncommitted, by supporting a group of

^ Walker, p. 110; William Allen White, "Candidates in the
Spring," Yale Review 29 (March 1940): 436-37; Cleveland Plain Dealer,
27 March 1940, p. 8.
^

New York Times, 17 February 1939, p. 14.
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favorite sons, until it was clear which way the convention would go,
and whether Dewey showed enough ability to handle the presidency.

15

As with all the other candidates, Dewey had both elements of support
and handicaps which could prove very damaging.

To gain the

nomination he would find it necessary to wage an active campaign.
As events of 1938 and 1939 were taking place, and as
Vandenberg, Dewey, and other potential candidates were being mentioned
for the nomination, Taft continued in his two roles as new Senator
and critic of the New Deal.

On February 11, 1939 he made a Lincoln

Day speech in Cincinnati which strongly urged change in government.
He compared the New Deal to a: "...great automobile plant with
thousands of machines making different automobile parts and no one
charged with the responsibility of finding out whether the parts
will fit together when their manufacture is completed."

16

Taft’s

name frequently appeared in articles describing his speeches, as
a possible candidate for the nomination.^
more numerous.

And his speeches became

He received national exposure when he agreed to

debate Democratic Congressman T. V, Smith of Illinois over the
Columbia Broadcasting System.

These debates ranged over many

aspects of the New Deal; and a Gallup poll indicated that most

^

New York Times, 20 May 1939, p. 6.
Ibid., 12 February 1939, p. 41.

17

Noel George Rapp, "The Political Speaking of Senator
Robert A. Taft," (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis: Purdue University, 1955),
p. 104.
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people believed that Taft had the better of the argument.
of Taft's speeches came off well.

18

Not all

One which did not happened to be

his first face to face confrontation with President Roosevelt, in
the spring of 1939 at the annual Gridiron Club banquet.

These annual

affairs were usually full of fun and satire with an undercurrent of
partisan politics.

Taft spent most of the day of the dinner at a

meeting of the Yale corporation, and just managed to scribble a few
notes on the train ride from New Haven to Washington.

Roosevelt

chided Taft for thinking as one who lived in the horse and buggy days.
Taft's response was to repeat his attacks on bureaucracy in
Washington, and to criticize his reporter hosts for thinking that
everything newsworthy occurred in the nation's Capitol.

He urged

them to give more attention to what went on in the states.

:,Did

you ever see anyone commit political suicide like that," was
Roosevelt's reaction.

Thomas Dewey just grinned when it was over.

19

This speech did little to help Taft's position in Washington.
It seems, however, to have had little effect on his decision to
seek the nomination— a question which was in the back of Taft's mind.
His record as a vote getter in Ohio was good.

Before he could

finally decide, he had to find out what another potential candidate

18

Frank A. Burd, "Robert Alfonzo Taft and the American Under
standing of Politics," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: University
of Chicago, 1969), pp. 41-42. There were thirteen debates which were
published as a book in 1940. See: T. V. Smith and Robert A. Taft,
Foundations of Democracy: A Series of Debates, (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1940.) Smith was a professor of philosophy at the University
of Chicago before entering Congress.
19

James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A.
Taft, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 186.
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from Ohio was going to do.

This was John W. Bricker who was

elected Governor in 1938.
Newspaper reporters like to say that John Bricker looked like
a president of the United States.
Taft need not have worried.
an excellent campaigner.

If that were his only qualification

But Bricker was a strong vote getter and

His margin in the gubernatorial election

of 1938 was only slightly less than Taft's.

20

Both men could not seek the nomination in the same year.

Such

a contest would divide the Ohio Republican Party, and possibly
endanger its chances in the statewide elections of 1940.
question was which man would step aside.

The

At first neither seemed

willing to withdraw; friends of both began working for support.
Taft had the stronger position.

21

His Senate term was six years in

length, while Bricker's term as Governor would only last until 1940.
For a time Party leaders tried to work out a compromise which
would permit both men to test their candidacies, and allow the Ohio
delegation to remain uncommitted until the time of the convention.
These efforts ran up against two obstacles.

First they received

a cool reception from the prospective candidates, and second, the
Ohio primary law posed difficulties.

This law provided that any

person who wanted to become a delegate to the convention had to run
in the primary.

Before his name could be placed on the ballot,

however, he had to secure permission from both his first and

20

Moscow, p. 26; James A Hagerty, New York Times, 19 April
1939, p. 46.
^

Ibid.; Patterson, pp. 206-07.
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second choice for the nomination.

There was no way to run an

unpledged slate of delegates, unless two stalking horses could be
found to hold the delegation together up to the time of the convention.
No such men were found.

Bricker, however, was making enemies within

county organizations because he did not follow their recommendations
on political appointments.

When a Gallup poll announced that Taft

was the more popular of the two, Bricker began to think twice about
his candidacy.

23

After several meetings with Taft, Bricker decided to withdraw.
Subsequent events gave the appearance that an agreement was worked
out which would allow Taft to run in 1940 and Bricker in 1944.
Little evidence exists to support this theory.

24

On July 15, 1939

the Governor announced that he was not a candidate, and that he
fully supported Senator Taft.

25

Though Bricker had withdrawn, his supporters kept trying to
inject him back into the race.

As late as June 8, 1940, two weeks

before the opening of the convention at Philadelphia, there was
a rumor that Bricker was trying to undermine Taft’s candidacy.
Part of this was press speculation, but Taft had to be very careful

22

Paul T. David; Ralph M. Goldman; and Richard C. Bane, The
Politics of National Party Conventions, (Washington, D. C.: Brookings
Institution, 1960), pp. 539-40.
2^ Patterson, p. 207.
24 Ibid., pp. 207-08.
2“* New York Times, 16 July 1939, p. 3.
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not to offend the Governor.

In fairness to Bricker it must be

said that when it came' to the balloting he did all that he could to
help Taft gain the nomination, not only in 1940, but also in 1948
and 1952.
By late July 1939, therefore, Taft had reason to think that he
would be supported by a united Party in Ohio, and that this support
would provide a base for an effort to gain the nomination.

Many

people remained uncertain that it was the right time for Taft to run.
He was, after all, only a first term Senator, and many others had
this qualification.

Despite this shortcoming, he had assets.

His

name was well known throughout the country, and people said, if it
meant anything, that he looked like all sixteen million Republicans
rolled into one.

27

Perhaps it again was time for a Taft to succeed

a Roosevelt, as his father had done in 1909.

Taft certainly

believed that he should try to succeed Theodore Roosevelt's distant
cousin Franklin in 1940.

28

The political wheels then began to roll.

Taft received in

August 1939 a letter from George Eyrich, Chairman of the Hamilton
County (Ohio) Republican Executive Committee which urged the Senator
to allow his name to be used by candidates for delegates to the
convention in the 1940 primary, as first choice for the presidential

26

Cincinnati Enquirer, 9 June 1940, p. 18; New York Times,
20 August 1939, p. 30; Cincinnati Enquirer, 12 May 1940, p. 6;
Cleveland Plain Dealer, 9 June 1940, p. 23a.
27
28

Parmet and Hecht, p. 66.
Patterson, p. 205.
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nomination.

29

Taft responded to the letter by saying:
Of course I am greatly honored and pleased by the action of
the Hamilton County Republican Executive Committee in asking
me to permit my name to go before the voters of Ohio as the
first choice for President of delegates in the Republican
National Convention...The work as Senator from Ohio is
extremely interesting and I prefer it to any other office.
I will not run away from a harder job, but whether I am a
candidate for any other office is entirely up to the
Republicans of Ohio...As an Ohio matter therefore, I shall
be willing when the time comes, to give my consent to have
my name designated as the first choice by candidates for
delegates throughout the state.30
Taft was the first person to announce his candidacy for the
1940 Republican nomination.

For a time no other candidate joined

him, and so Taft began to believe that he might be able to win
without a great deal of campaigning and intra-party struggle.

31

By early December 1939 this hope had to be abandoned when
Thomas Dewey declared his candidacy and his intention to enter
several primaries to test his vote getting ability.

32

A month

later, Frank Gannett, an up-state New York newspaper publisher
announced that he too intended to seek the Republican nomination.

33

There was also competition from a non-candidate. Arthur Vandenberg
had indicated even before the Taft announcement that he would not
actively seek the nomination, but if offered to him, he would

^

New York Times, 4 August 1939, p. 1.

3 0

TVJ

c
Ibid., p. 5.

31 Patterson, p. 208.
^
33

New York Times, 2 December 1939, p. 1; Walker, p. 111.
Cleveland Plain Dealer, 17 January 1940, p. 1.
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accept.

Vandenberg’s friends entered slates of delegates for him

in primaries in Wisconsin and Nebraska.

34

As 1940 began Taft thought, with good reason, that Dewey would
be his chief rival.

He shaped his strategy accordingly.

His plan

was to appeal to Party leaders and opinion makers while at the same
time continuing attacks on the New Deal.

Taft visited twenty-eight

states and traveled over thirty thousand miles, from the summer
of 1939 until the spring of 1940.

This campaigning received

intensive press coverage, and by February 1940 Walter Lippman
could write that the Republicans would not pick a dark horse in
1940, but rather choose between Taft and Dewey.
the whole he was more impressed with Taft.

He added that on

The columnist wrote:

While his views are conventional and often narrow...
he has the saving grace of intellectual humility. He
will examine the evidence and he will listen to
reason...He is not intoxicated with his own rhetoric
or in love with himself as a public personage. His
conservative philosophy is sincere conviction imbeded
in a genuinely liberal character. Given a little
more time to develop his qualities, Mr. Taft, who
has gone far in one year of public life would then be
as promising a candidate as the Republicans have had
in some decades.35
Lippman concluded that lack of experience would make either Taft
or Dewey a risky choice but that risk would be less with Taft
because of his "rather exceptional capacity for judgment and a

^ New York Times, 28 February 1939, p. 2; Parmat and Hecht,
p. 70; Johnson, p. 70.
^

Cleveland Plain Dealer, 13 February 1940, p. 9.
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disciplined mind."^
By early 1940 Taft's campaign was making progress.

He stressed

the inefficiency of the New Deal, and urged that Republicans should
not propose to keep some parts of it while eliminating others.
"me too" approach, he felt, would be confusing to the voters.
had tried it in 1936 and had been defeated.

This
Landon

Taft believed that the

Republicans should be critical of the whole program, and propose
alternatives where needed.

The fundamental question, as Taft put

it on February 3 was, "shall the administration be guided by the
belief in prosperity by the means of government bureaus, government
regulations, and government in business itself; or shall it rely
on the restoration of private enterprise and business activity?"

37

Taft believed that prosperity had not been achieved even with
massive government interference, and that it was time for the private
sector to have a chance.
Though Taft's supporters were pleased with the progress of his
campaign they became increasingly troubled about certain matters.
There were three areas of concern.
primaries.

First was his refusal to enter

Second was the way in which his image and personality

were coming across to the voters.

And third, especially late in the

campaign, was the deepening world crisis and because of it the
emergence of a dark horse candidate, Wendell L. Willkie of Indiana.
It is now necessary to examine these problems.

36

Cleveland Plain Dealer, 13 February 1940, p. 9. By June
1940 Lippman had changed hi'- mind about Taft. See: Cincinnati
Enquirer, 25 June 1940, p. 4.
37

Cleveland Plain Dealer, 4 February 1940, p. 4a.
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In 1940, as in most other presidential election years in the
20th century, several states held primaries to select delegates to
national conventions.

Taft had to decide which, if any, of these

primaries he should enter to gain the most for his candidacy.

He

came to the conclusion that he would enter only the Ohio primary
in May, thus declining to participate in several other contests.
Taft's reasoning was that primaries took up too much time and money,
and in many cases were meaningless.

Besides, in some of them there

was more than one Republican faction, and Taft believed that his
entry would worsen potentially divisive situations.
Some of Taft's leading supporters thought that he should test
his popularity at least once against the other leading candidates,
Dewey and Vandenberg.

Both had slates of delegates entered in the

primaries in Wisconsin and Nebraska, and Dewey was unopposed on the
ballot in Illinois, Maryland and New Jersey.
to enter any of these primaries.

Taft nonetheless refused

He announced on February 7, 1940

that he would not have his name entered in Illinois because a
campaign in that state would be time consuming and expensive.

38

Thus he conceded most of Illinois' fifty-eight convention delegates
to Dewey.

Two weeks later he announced that he would not enter a

slate in the Wisconsin primary presumably for the same reason, though
no such reason was given in the official announcement.

39

It seemed,

for a brief time, that he might enter the New Jersey, West Virginia

38
39

New York Times, 8 February, 1940, p. 22.
Ibid., 18 February 1940, p. 2.
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or Maryland primaries.

Supporters in New Jersey filed petitions in

Taft’s name, but the Senator requested the Secretary of State to
remove his name from the ballot, on the ground that his duties in the
Senate would not give him time to campaign.

40

West Virginia was a slightly different case.

Taft indicated on

February 23 that he might enter that state’s primary, because he could
stop to campaign there during trips from Washington to Ohio.

Taft

sent his papers to Walter Hallanan, National Committeeman from West
Virginia with instructions that they should be filed if another
candidate entered the primary first.

Oddly enough, Dewey took the

same line of strategy, with the result that Hallanan had both sets of
papers, but could do nothing with them.

41

Taft was denied a chance

to test his strength against Dewey in West Virginia.
Maryland was Taft's last chance to test his popularity outside
Ohio.

This test seemed all the more important since Dewey defeated

Vandenberg convincingly in Wisconsin and Nebraska.

42

Taft was torn

between the need to beat Dewey in a primary, and the idea that he
could stay out of a factional struggle in Maryland between former
Governor Harry Nice and William F. Broening,

Mayor of Baltimore.

The matter was complicated further when both

factions came out for

Dewey.

Therefore he conceded Maryland's sixteen votes by announcing

40

New York Times, 24 February 1940, p. 7; 2 April 1940, p. 6;
3 April 1940, p. 8.
^

Ibid., 18 April 1940, p. 17.

^ Cleveland Plain Dealer, 3 April 1940,p. 1; 4 April 1940, p. 1;
10 April 1940, p. 1; New York Times, 4 April
1940, p. 14; 11 April1940,
p. 11.
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on April 18 that his name would not be entered in the primary.

43

Taft pointed out that Dewey had filed in only five of the thirteen
states where primaries were held, and he thought that by the same logic
his reasons for not filing in Maryland should be understood.

44

By not entering the Maryland primary, Taft lost his last chance
to test his vote getting ability against that of Dewey.

Along with

his relatively poor showing in the polls, this decision would be a
handicap as the convention drew near.

Already some Republicans were

making the comment that, ’’Taft can’t win"— a comment that would be
heard more frequently in Taft's second and third tries for the
presidency.^
The second problem which weakened Taft's candidacy was the
Senator's image.

Forrest Davis, his publicity expert, commented

that, "Taft speaks as if he were submitting a brief in a probate case
.46
rather than addressing an audience."

When he was talking over the

radio, that audience might number millions of people.

Another

observer said, "Taft has the ability but lacks the oomph."

47

Hoping

to improve Taft's image, his law partner John Hollister, had a
suggestion.

He urged Taft to put personal comments in his campaign

correspondence.

^
44

He wrote, "he lacks the feel of this kind of thing,

Mew York Times, 19 April 1940, p. 17.

^

Ibid.

^

Arthur Krock, New York Times, 21 April 1940, p. 22.

46

Patterson, p. 213.

47 T,
-,
Ibxd.
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and does not understand how much people like ro be patted on the
back."48
The press, notably the Luce publications Time and Life, played
up this seeming lack of color.

Time was fond of calling Taft "inept,"

and later titled his campaign, "The Adventures of Robert in Bumbledom"
in the same article, Taft was called the Dagwood Bumstead of American
politics.

49

Taft's campaign managers tried to ease the problem by circulating
anecdotes about his ancestors— especially his grandfather, Alfonzo
Taft.

The Senator, however, kept the seemingly colorless style of

campaigning, and though his standing in the public opinion polls did
not go up, it did not decline.

The problem of Taft's image would be

present throughout his three bids for the Republican nomination.
The third concern of Taft's campaign staff was the one over
which they had the least control.
September 1939.

War broke out in Europe in

Aspirants to the nomination did not feel its effect

until the spring of 1940 when the Germans invaded Norway, Denmark,
France and the Low Countries.
In mid-May, Taft toured the Middle West to confer with convention
delegates, and to make major addresses in Topeka and St. Louis.

He

detected a growing sympathy for the allies, and also found Party
leaders worried by Dewey's inexperience and unwillingness to make
definite statements concerning the situation in Europe.

48

Landon and

Patterson, p. 213.

AQ

"Hare and Tortoise," Time 34 (18 December 1939): 13; "Speech
Making Candidate," Time 35 (12 February 1940): 18; "Men a Plenty,"
Time 35 (14 April 1940): 20.
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others were also concerned by the fact that Dewey would not be taking
a united New York delegation to the convention; if he could not unite
New York he would have difficulty throughout the rest of the n a t i o n . 50
Taft was optimistic about his chances of support from the Middle
West.

Republican leaders in America’s

on domestic affairs.

heartland liked Taft’s views

Some of them, including Landon, were not as

happy with his position on the war.

He made his stand clear at Topeka

when he said:
This is no time for the people to be wholly absorbed in
foreign battles simply because the newspapers, with
screaming headlines, devote the first three pages exclu
sively to news from Europe.51
He believed the people should concentrate on domestic affairs to
make sure that the New Deal would not add to an already huge
bureaucracy. ^
Though this position did not hurt his chances in the Middle West,
it did have a negative effect in the East, where support for the
allies was widespread.

Easterners, such as Ogden Reid, editor of

the New York Herald Tribune, believed that:

Dewey was too inexperi

enced to handle the world crisis, Taft was an isolationist, and
Vandenberg showed less sympathy for the allies than did Taft.

These

internationalists took a wait-and-see attitude toward the nomination.

McCoy, p. 425; New York Times, 31 January 1940, p. 12.
Several delegates from New York supported Frank Gannet. Others
decided to support Wendell Willkie when he became involved in the
race for the nomination.
New York Times, 19 May 1940, p. 4; Turner Catledge, My Life
and the Times, (New York: Funk and Wagnells, 1971), pp. 118-19.
52 Ibid.
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Perhaps some dark horse would be more acceptable than the candidates
who were already running.

53

Possibly, thought some of them,

Wendell L. Willkie of Indiana might be such a candidate.
The movement which resulted in the nomination of Willkie was
given impetus, though not its beginning, by the worsening world
situation.
54
Times,

It began well before that.

Arthur Krock of the New York

wrote a column in February 1939 in which the possibility

of the Republicans nominating Willkie was discussed.

His conclusion

was that the Hoosier would have to be "the darkest horse in the
stable in 1940."
The column drew considerable interest and Krock followed it
with another in August.^
that time.

Willkie's chances had not improved by

When asked by a friend to support the Hoosier,

Kenneth F. Simpson, National Committeeman from New York, summed up
the reasons why he would not, and could not, be nominated by
saying:
So I'm supposed to go...and tell the boys that we will
all pull together to get the nomination for Wendell
Willkie. They'll say: "Willkie! who's Willkie?" I'll
tell them he's the President of Commonwealth and Southern.
The next question will b e : !IWhere does that railroad go
to?" And I will explain it isn't a railroad, it's a
public utility holding company. Then they will look at
me sadly and say: "Ken, we always thought you were a bit

53

Johnson, pp. 105-06, n; Patterson, pp. 219-20; Hugh Ross,
!,Was the Nomination of Wendell Willkie a Political Miracle,"
Indiana Magazine of History. 58 (June 1962): 81.
23 February 1939, p. 22.
Ibid., 16 August 1939, p. 22.
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eratic, now we know you are just plain crazy." And that
will be without my even getting to mention that he's a
Democrat.56
Simpson had his facts straight.

Willkie had been a Democrat;

as late as 1938 he had supported the Democratic ticket.

As

President of a public utility, he fought the New Deal on the question
of public power, and managed to get a settlement with the Tennessee
Valley Authority which was very favorable to his company. ^

Willkie's

opposition to the Roosevelt administration did not enter foreign
affairs to any great extent.

He supported the administration in

that field, and thus recommended himself to internationally-minded
Republicans.
At first Willkie took connecting his name with the presidency
as something of a joke.

Asked by a reporter to comment on a state

ment by General Hugh Johnson, that he would make a powerful candidate,
Willkie said: "in view of the speed with which the government is
taking over my business, shortly I will have to be looking for a new
job.

General Johnson's is the best offer I've had thus far."

58

By

February 1940, this mood changed to a serious realization that some

Moscow, p. 44. A slightly different version of Simpson's
statement is given in: Mary Earhart Dillon, Wendell Willkie:
1892-1944, (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippencott, 1952), p. 130. Simpson
supported Willkie at the convention though he probably was not, as
Dillon says, Willkie's most powerful supporter in New York. He
was defeated for reelection to the National Committee by Dewey's
campaign manager, J. Russell Sprague, two weeks before the convention.
See: New York Times and New York Herald Tribune, 13 June 1940, p. 1.

^ Elsworth Barnard, Wendell Willkie Fighter for Freedom,
(Marquette, Michigan: Northern Michigan University Press, 1966),
p. 143.
Ibid., p. 148.
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people truly wanted to see him President.

At Wooster, Ohio he said:

Of course it will not happen, but if the nomination were given
me without any strings, I would have to accept it. No man in
middle life and in good health could do otherwise. I couldn't
go out and seek delegates by making two-sided statements. I
value my independence.59
Willkie received more and more invitations to speak, and by March
he made his first significant appearance in a poll.^

In April his

candidacy received wide publicity when his article "We the People,"
appeared in Fortune magazine.
response.

6X

The article received a favorable

Soon several groups began circulating petitions and

collecting money to further the Willkie candidacy.

62

By this time,

Willkie had decided to seek the nomination.
The first indication of:this decision came when Willkie spoke
to a group of Republicans in St. Paul— his first speech to a partisan
gathering.

Staged as it was, in the supposedly isolaticmis. Middle

West, many individuals wondered how his listeners would react.
first the reaction was not very favorable.

At

The speech, presented

to both a live and radio audience, was lifeless.

At its conclusion

he threw the speech away and said: "Now we are off the air and I
don't have to use so damn much fine language.

What I have really

been trying to say is we sure got to get rid of that bunch,

59

the

New York Times, 31 January 1940, p. 5.

^

Cleveland Plain Dealer, 25 March 1940, p. 12.

^

Wendell L. Willkie, "We the People," Fortune (April 1940),

p. 64.
62

New York Times, 14 April 1940, p. 20; 15 April 1940, p. 20;
2 June 1940, p. 2.
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New Deal

and I'll tell you how.to do it."

63

and after finishing received a long ovation.

He proceeded to do so,
Several Minnesota

delegates immediately announced that they would support Willkie at
the convention.^
The St. Paul speech began the drive which would lead Willkie to
the nomination.

That event was still more than a month away.

In

mid-May most observers still saw the Hoosier as a dark horse candidate
whose only chance lay in a deadlocked convention.^

A deadlocked

convention was the last thing on the mind of Robert Taft or
Thomas Dewey.
With a month to go before the convention, the strategies of
Dewey, Taft and Willkie became apparent.

The position of Dewey was

the most critical of the three because his test of strength would
come early in the convention balloting.

He was the early front

runner, both in the public opinion polls and in committed delegates.
He won primaries, as previously noted, over Vandenberg in Wisconsin
and Nebraska— thus removing the Michigan Senator from the ranks of
leading contenders.

Vandenberg would go to the convention with

only a few pledged delegates, half of which were from his native
state.

66

63
^

Dewey was unopposed in primaries in Illinois, Maryland

Parmet and Hecht, pp. 98-99; Johnson, p. 66.
Barnard, p. 161; Parmet and Hecht, pp. 98-99.

^ Frank Kent, Cincinnati Enquirer, 8 May 1940, p. 4; 10 May
1940, p. 4; Emmett Crozier, Cincinnati Enquirer, 19 May 1940, p. 24.

66

Parmet and Hecht, p. 80; Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The
Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin,
1952), p. 6.
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and New Jersey, and thus picked up delegates from these states
As the world situation worsened these committed delegates began to
waiver.

To be sure, the primaries left them morally bound to Dewey,

but how binding was the legal commitment?
situation have any bearing?

And did a different world

Several delegations believed that it did.

In Nebraska and Illinois there was considerable sentiment to switch
to Taft at the earliest possible moment— perhaps the second or third
ballot.

68

In New Jersey, and even Dewey’s New York, support for

Willkie was seen.*^
Dewey's strategy was obvious.
early or not at all.

At the convention he had to win

When the professional politicians saw that

delegates were leaving him for another candidate his chances would
be finished.

These switches suggested weakness; and politicians did

not like candidates who showed this trait at conventions.
The District Attorney was worried by still another matter.

The

public opinion polls showed that he was losing some of his popular
strength, and that Willkie was gaining rapidly.

During the first week

in May the polls reported that sixty-seven percent of Republicans
surveyed favored Dewey's nomination.

Two weeks later his popularity

dropped to sixty-two percent, and by the week of the convention it

67

Parmet and Hecht, pp. 80-1, 106. It must be pointed out that
Willkie received twenty thousand write-in votes in the New Jersey
primary.
^

New York Times, 18 May 1940, p. 34; 22 May 1940, p. 18.

69

New York Herald Tribune, 6 June 1940, p. 17; New York Times,
6 May 1940, p. 8; Ross, p. 86.
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slipped to twenty-nine percent.^

These figures showed a lack of

confidence in Dewey, and they would not help his chances in a lengthy
convention.
The strategies of Taft and Willkie were, on the surface, quite
similar.

Both candidates would allow their vote totals to grow from

ballot to ballot.

In the case of Willkie, this was by necessity; and

in the case of Taft it was a combination of necessity and choice.
Taft had a base of delegate support from which to work.

His native

Ohio could be counted on, unless it was seen that he would not get the
nomination.

He was also supported by Old Guard leaders and therefore

would receive considerable support from the South and Middle West.
Newspaper surveys suggested that he might have at least as many
delegates as Dewey on the first ballot.^

Unlike Dewey, Taft expected

to increase his support as the balloting proceeded.

His tour of the

Middle West in May suggested that he would receive support on the
second and subsequent ballots: from Illinois, after a first ballot vote
for Dewey, from Iowa, after a complimentary vote for the former head
of the Veterans of Foreign Wars Hanford MacNider, and from other states
in the region.

72

He also hoped that Herbert Hoover would use his

influence in the California delegation to increase his vote total.

73

^ Cincinnati Enquirer, 17 May 1940, p. 4; 1 June 1940, p. 4;
New York Times, 21 June 1940, p. 17; Parmet and Hecht, pp. 103, 111;
Ross, p. 80-1.
^

Cleveland Plain Dealer, 23 June 1940, p. 21a.

^

New York Times, 22 May 1940, p. 18; 24 May 1940, 4: p. 10.

73

Patterson, p. 224.
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Taft's strategy was to conserve his strength.

He would start with

between two hundred and three hundred delegates and add to that total
with the hope of being nominated on the fourth or fifth ballot.

74

Willkie also hoped to add strength gradually, though his vote
total would be smaller than that of Taft on the first ballot.

His

showing in the Gallup poll improved from three percent on May 3 to
forty-seven percent on June 28, the day of balloting at the convention.
If this popular support was translated into delegates, Willkie would
have a large vote total at some point in the balloting.^

Willkie

found that many New England delegates were committed to favorite son
candidates; and he therefore decided to seek support in this part of
the country.

He achieved quick success.

Governor William Vander

bilt of Rhode Island released the delegation from its commitment to
him, and urged that the delegates support Willkie.

Six of eight

Rhode Island delegates indicated that they would -follow the wishes
of the Governor.^
On the eve of the convention another New England Governor, Raymond
E. Baldwin of Connecticut, released his delegation, with the statement
that all of the delegates would support Willkie on the first ballot.^
Other announcements of support for Willkie (notably from New York and

74
^

Patterson, p. 224.
Ross, pp. 80-81.
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Parmet and Hecht, pp. 114-15; New York Herald Tribune, 16 June
1940, p. 26.
^

Ibid., 24 June 1940, p. 1; New York Times, 24 June 1940, p. 1.
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Pennsylvania) were made in the first hours of the c o n v e n t io n . 78

These

declarations suggested that a powerful force was in motion— a force
which the other candidates would have to stop to gain the nomination.
Philadelphia, site of the 1940 Republican Convention, greeted a
group of tense and uncertain delegates in the middle of June.

They

were tense because of the world situation and the way in which
President Roosevelt had reacted to it.

Each day newspapers were full

of gloomy headlines concerning the war in Europe.

On June 21, the

delegates read that Roosevelt had-appointed two of their number,
Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, to the cabinet, in order to give the
impression of bi-partisanship.

79

The convention seemed wide open, since no candidate was likely
to win on the first ballot.

Some surveys, notably in the Cleveland

Plain Dealer,®® predicted that Taft would lead with about 300 votes;
Dewey would be next with 265 votes; and Willkie, though with few
votes at the start, could have almost, limitless strength if a
deadlock should develop.

The survey also indicated that there were

hundreds of delegates who were supporting favorite son candidates.
Other newspaper predictions showed a different picture.®*
reporters believed that

Dewey would lead on

7^ New York Times, 24 June 1940, p. 1;

Many

the first ballot with

Ross, p. 95; Barnard,p. 175.

79 Ibid., 21 June 1940, p. 1.
80 23 June 1940, p. 21a.
New York Herald Tribune, 2 June 1940, 2: p. 2; 13 June 1940,
p.
13; 16 June 1940, p. 26; New York Times,
3 June 1940, p. 1;
Cincinnati Enquirer, 9 June 1940, p. 9.
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350 votes.

Taft would be second with between 275 and 300 votes.

All of the surveys agreed that many delegates would support
favorite sons on early ballots.

The largest block of delegates in this

category was the seventy-two vote Pennsylvania group, pledged to
Governor Arthur James.

This maneuver was a means of keeping the dele

gation together, until Joseph Pew of the Sun Oil Company, and other
state leaders could decide which way to go.

Taft supporters believed

that Pew would throw the delegation their way on the fourth or fifth
ballot, a move which, together with the collapse of Dewey and support
of Hoover, would lead to the nomination of the Senator.

82

There was,

however, considerable sentiment in the delegation for Willkie.
Almost as important as the seventy-two votes from Pennsylvania,
were thirty-eight votes from Michigan.

The Michigan people agreed to

hold the line for Vandenberg, thus providing him a base of support if
the convention found itself deadlocked.

If this happened, the chances

of the Senator from Michigan might improve.

If it did not, Michigan's

delegates could begin the swing to the eventual nominee.

83

On the morning of June 24, one thousand delegates assembled in
Philadelphia's Convention Hall to see National Chairman, John D. M.
Hamilton of Kansas, call the twenty-second Republican National Convention
to order.

84

The delegates had not been in a vacuum, and knew about the
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New York Herald Tribune, 20 June 1940, p. 1; New York Times,
19 June 1940, p. 17; 20 June 1940, p. 20.
83

Ibid., 17 May 1940, p. 15; Cincinnati Enquirer, 17 May 1940, p. 3.

^ Official Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-Second
Republican National Convention, (Washington, D.C.: Judd & Detweiler,
1940), p. 17, gives the apportionment of the delegates,
(hereafter
referred to as: Proceedings♦)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

44
campaigns of the candidates— both those who were front runners, and those
whose activities had accomplished little except the spending of a great
deal of money.

They knew that they were meeting in troubled times, and

that their work of five days would overshadow all of the campaigning
which had gone before.

Hopeful that their decision would have impact in

years to come, they approached their task with serious attention.

Most

of them were open-minded and though some had commitments for the early
ballots, they would not be committed forever.

The delegates would watch

the activities of the candidates and make a choice according to their
best judgment.

Only four days remained in which they could be

persuaded.
The first day of the convention was taken up by routine matters,
the most notable of which was the keynote speech of Governor Harold E.
Stassen of Minnesota.

The speech was typical of keynote addresses in

that all the platitudes which suggested the reasons for Republican
victory were present.

The most significant feature of the speech was

the man who spoke: two days later Stassen announced that he would act
as Willkie's floor manager, thus further stimulating the Hoosier's
push for the nomination.

85

As the convention was

meeting, the candidates and

worked behind the scenes. Their emphasis had shifted.

their managers

The main

activity was now not stopping Dewey, but rather to check Willkie.
Despite gains for the Hoosier, Taft supporters remained confident.
The Ohio delegation was solid, and working hard to convince other

OC

New York Times, 25 June 1940, p. 17; 27 June 1940, p. 1.
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delegations that Taft was the man.

They reminded other delegates that

they had known Willkie as a good Democratic State Committeeman during
the 1920's, and that he had attended the Democratic National Convention
as a delegate in 1924.

They asked, rhetorically, if their colleagues

truly wanted a former Democrat to have the Republican nomination.

86

On Monday night a Taft strategy meeting was held at the Union
League Club.

All of the Ohio delegates were assigned to other state

delegations to assist a Taft campaign staff of over two hundred.

The

strategists at the meeting also decided to release an announcement by
Ohio Congressman Thomas Jenkins, and forty other Congressmen from twenty
states, which urged the Republicans not to nominate a former Democrat
for President.

87

Taft was busy on the first day of the Convention.
from many of the states, including Ohio.

88

He met delegates

Along with his supporters,

he believed that his strength was holding and that Willkie would be
stopped.
The pulse of the convention quickened on Tuesday, June 25, when
delegates heard a much-anticipated speech from Herbert Hoover.

Some

observers believed that the former President would speak in such a
way as to stampede the Convention into drafting him for the nomination.
This did not happen.

By their long and loud ovations the delegates

showed respect for Hoover.

86

However, the respect did not translate into

Cincinnati Enquirer, 24 June 1940, p. 6.

87 Ibid., 25 June 1940, p. 2.
88 Ibid., p. 3; New York Herald Tribune, 25 June 1940, p. 10.
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delegate support.

Though a few delegates voted for him when the bal-

loting began, his candidacy never got off the ground.
Off the convention floor activity was frenzied.

89
Thousands of tele

grams poured in to Philadelphia urging delegates to nominate Willkie.
Some were from genuine supporters, while others were phonies.

Alf Landon

reported that when he returned to Kansas from the convention, he found
several mail sacks full of his responses to the telegrams with "address
unknown" stamped on them.
in alphabetical order.

90

Other messages were found with signatures

And still others, from predominantly Republican

districts, bore names of people not recognized by local Party officials.
Whether genuine or not, the telegrams exerted a great deal of pressure
on the delegates.

Western Union sent over forty thousand on Thursday,

the night of the balloting.

92

The anti-Willkie forces were also active.

Some newspaper reports

suggested that Taft was the only candidate who could stop the Hoosier.
Charles P. Taft, the Senator's brother, and Davis S. Ingalls, his
campaign manager, announced that gains were being made in the Middle
West.

93

A meeting took place between Ingalls and J. Russell Sprague,

Dewey's campaign manager to make an arrangement whereby one candidate

89

Proceedings, pp. 126-133; Parmet and Hecht, pp. 136-37;
Charles Hurd, New York Times, 26 June 1940, p. 1.
90

Me Coy, p. 443.
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Cincinnati Enquirer, 24 June 1940, p. 6; 26 June 1940, p. 6;
Barnard, pp. 174-75.
92

Joseph Barnes, Willkie, (New York; Simon & Schuster, 1952),
p. 185; Barnard, p. 182.
^

New York Herald Tribune, 26 June 1940, p. 15.
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would be supported for the presidential nomination and the other would
take the vice-presidency.

The trouble was that the conferees could

not agree whether it was to be a Dewey-Taft ticket, or a Taft-Dewey ticket.
Though discussions continued, no progress was m ade. 94
Wednesday, the third day of the convention, was the day on which
names were placed in nomination.

This task followed the unanimous

adoption of the Party's platform.
alphabetical order.

The roll of states was called in

Each state could yield to another further down

the roll, reserve the right to nominate a candidate, or pass.

After

completion of the call of the states, those delegations which had
indicated a desire to present a candidate were given the opportunity
to do s o . ^

Both Alabama and Arizona yielded to New York, so that

Dewey and Frank Gannett could be nominated.9^

Then it was Taft's turn.

Arkansas yielded to Ohio, which allowed the Chairman of the Convention,
Joseph W. Martin of Massachusetts, to recognize Grove Patterson, editor
of the Toledo Blade, for the purpose of placing Taft's name in nomina
tio n .^

Patterson began by saying:

Ohio, mother of presidents, brings to this convention a
great American. He has a constructive program. He has.
knowledge and experience in foreign affairs. He has
imagination and courage. He is an amazing vote getter.98

9^ Moscow, pp. 95-6. Dewey and Vandenberg held similar discussions
with the same result. See: Vandenberg, pp. 6-7.
Q C

Proceedings. pp. 161-66.
96 Ibid., pp. 167, ff.
9^ Cleveland Plain Dealer, 11 February 1940, p. 21, gives some
background on Grove Patterson.
98

Proceedings, p. 189.
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The remainder of the speech described Taft's qualifications in each of
the four areas.

Patterson told how Taft was opposed to government

controls of the economic system, and the bureaucracy which that control
bred.

He was not opposed to relief and public works projects, instead

he wanted to see them administered at the state and local level.

In

international affairs, Patterson said that Taft had served with Herbert
Hoover on projects for European relief, in a time of crisis and thus
could handle the situation in 1940.

Patterson pointed out that Taft

had done well in the elections of 1938, and thus had popular appeal.
As Patterson said, Taft may not have been the best back slapper, but
he had the best backbone.

"He has the courage to be himself."

99

Patterson concluded by pointing out, in obvious reference to Willkie,
that his man was a "real Republican," and then presented— "a great
American, Robert A. Taft."*^

After a demonstration which lasted about

twenty minutes, the convention listened to four seconding speeches.
Willkie was presented next.

101

His name was placed in nomination by

Representative Charles A. Halleck of Indiana.

When Halleck was intro

duced to the convention, he received great cheers from the galleries,
and boos from the delegates on the floor.

This was an indication of

the popular sentiment for Willkie, though it was not clear whether the
delegates shared it.

99

102

Halleck broke tradition by mentioning his

Proceedings, pp. 191.

100 ...
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Ibid., p. 193.

New York Herald Tribune. 27 June 1940, p. 13; Proceedings.
pp. 194-98.
1 02

Ibid.
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candidate's name at the beginning of the speech.
cheering and booing.

This set off more

When Martin asked the galleries to be silent by-

pointing out to them that they were guests— one man responded: "Guests
hell, we are the convention."

103

The convention recessed after Willkie was placed in nomination.
Most observers believed, that though there would be more nominations on
Thursday, one of the four men placed in nomination Wednesday night
would be the candidate.

104

Thursday, the day of the balloting, began with the continuation of
nominations.

Iowa nominated Hanford MacNider; Michigan offered Arthur

Vandenberg; New Hampshire presented Senator H. Styles Bridges; Oregon's
favorite son was Senator Charles MacNary; Pennsylvania brought forward
Governor Arthur James; and South Dakota nominated Governor Harlan Bushfield.^^

Later that day the convention began its first ballot.

The first roll call went about as expected, though Taft did not
get as many votes as newspaper reporters had previously predicted.
Dewey led with 360 votes, Taft had 189, and Willkie was third with 105.
Others who received votes were: Bridges 28, Bushfield 9, Senator
Arthur Capper of Kansas 18, Gannett 33, Hoover 17, James 74, MacNary 13,
MacNider 34, Martin 44, and Vandenberg 76.^^

103

Joseph W. Martin, Jr., My First Fifty Years in Politics. (New
York: Magraw Hill, 1960), p. 155.
Cleveland Plain Dealer, 27 June 1940, p. 1.
Proceedings, pp. 217-267; New York Times, 28 June 1940, p. 3.
Proceedings, pp. 279-80.
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Taft's 189 votes came from twenty-eight states and four territories.
He received all fifty-two from Ohio and twenty-six from Texas.
largest block of votes was nine from Virginia.

His next

The rest were scattered

in small groups throughout the country— the vast majority coming from
the South and Middle West.
The convention was in great confusion, the galleries kept chanting
loudly, "We want Willkie, We want Willkie."
went on.

Nevertheless, the convention

108

The second ballot showed Dewey's strength beginning to slip.
still led, though with only 338 votes.
and had 203.
votes.

109

He

Taft gained only fourteen votes,

The big gainer was Willkie who jumped from 105 to 171

Taft's gains on this ballot were all small, with the largest

being five votes from Illinois.
At the conclusion of the second ballot, the convention recessed
for dinner.
pause.

Both Taft and Willkie supporters were active during the

Their activities centered around three men who controlled

significant blocks of delegates: Landon of Kansas, Vandenberg of
Michigan, and Joe Pew of Pennsylvania.
Of the three, Landon was the only one who was immediately available.
Pew had given orders not to be disturbed, and Vandenberg was comfort
ably settled in his hotel room.

Harold Stassen was the most successful

in cornering Landon, and though no public announcement concerning their
meeting was made, Landon swung the Kansas delegation to Willkie on

Proceedings, pp. 279-80.
108 Ibid., p. 281-82; Martin, p. 155.
109

Proceedings, p. 285.
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the fifth ballot.
Taft's chances rested on Pennsylvania and Michigan, but neither
state was ready to swing away from their favorite sons.

Taft could do

very little; events were moving too rapidly.
The convention reconvened at 8:30 p.m., and immediately began the
third ballot.
earlier.

Its result was the continuation of the trend begun

Dewey dropped from 338 to 315 votes, Willkie gained from 171

to 259 votes, and Taft from 203 to 212, his gains again being in small
groups from throughout the country.

112

Since the results of the third ballot were inconclusive, a fourth
roll call was necessary.

When the tabulation of the vote was announced

it was found that Taft had made his largest gain to that time.

He

regained second place with 254 votes, fifty-two behind Willkie's 306,
but four ahead of Dewey's 250.

The Senator's major gain (twenty-three

votes) came in Illinois, which was leaving Dewey en masse.

113

It was on the fourth ballot, however, that the Taft strategy
began to go awry.

Pew had not delivered any of Pennsylvania's votes,

and Herbert Hoover was still getting votes of his own, and therefore
was of no help.

Pennsylvania was

especially critical because a

growing number of delegates were leaving James for Willkie.

Despite

this trend Taft still hoped that he would get some support in the

Parmat and Hecht, p. 151; Johnson, p. 96; McCoy, p. 444;
Patterson, p. 225.
Patterson, pp. 224-26.
112
113

Proceedings. pp. 290-91.
Ibid., p. 296.
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Pennsylvania delegation.
The fifth ballot brought the collapse of Dewey.

He received only

fifty-seven votes; with Taft and Willkie dividing the votes of those
delegates who had left the New Yorker.

They also received support

from other favorite sons who had been given a chance, and failed.
vote was Willkie 429, and Taft 377.
previous ballot.

The

Each had gained 123 votes from the

It seemed to many that the sixth ballot would be the

last.115
As the sixth roll call proceeded, all waited to see what Michigan
would do.

Of the states which still supported favorite sons, it came

first on the roll.

Vandenberg realized that he had no chance of

winning the nomination, so he authorized Howard Lawrence to release the
delegation from its commitment.

There were some reports that he had

been pressured by assurances to Frank McKay, National Committeeman
from Michigan, that Willkie would favor the state in patronage appointments if he were elected President.

11 fi

Whatever the reason, when

Michigan was reached on the roll call, Howard Lawrence announced that
the vote was: "Hoover one; Taft two; and Willkie thirty-five."11^
This move marked the end of Taft's first real attempt to gain the
presidential nomination.

The additional thirty-five votes from Michigan

11^ Proceedings, pp. 290-91; 296, 302.
11^ Ibid., p. 302.
11^ Milton Kelly, Kalamazoo Gazette. 28 June 1940, 2: p. 1; Moscow,
p. 106; Vandenberg, p. 7-8; Johnson, pp. 99-100; Patterson, p. 228.
11^ Proceedings, p. 310.
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plus other gains gave Willkie 502 votes, more than enough for the
nomination, when Virginia was reached on the roll call.

At that point,

Pennsylvania, which had passed, interrupted the proceedings to announce
a unanimous seventy-two votes for Willkie.
the Hoosier already had a majority.

118

It was too late— because

There was nothing left except to

make the nomination unanimous.
Taft told his staff the next morning: "I had a lot of good ideas,
but I guess we will forget them now."

He then pledged his support for

119
Willkie.
In Taft's first try for the presidency, several shortcomings were
apparent.

He never aroused the popular enthusiasm which helped to

nominate Willkie.

He found it difficult to change when the world

situation became increasingly critical.

Delegates from the eastern sea

board were especially struck by this fact and therefore gave him little
support.
Another difficulty was his reliance on Old Guard leaders, Pew
and Hoover.

They could not win him the nomination, especially when

confronted by a “popular candidate who was sweeping the convention by
storm.

Willkie's popularity cannot be underestimated as a factor.

He

c ame seemingly from out of nowhere to capture the nomination, and this
meteoric rise submerged more important issues confronting the delegates
The talk of the delegates was of the phenomenal Hoosier, and try as he
might, Taft could not stem the tide.

Proceedings, p. 314.
119

Patterson, p. 229.
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On the other hand, Taft gained experience from his campaigning.
traveled widely and became better known to Republicans.

He

Though some

were critical of him because he did not easily change in a changing
situation, others admired him for this quality.
loyal to him in his future efforts.

These admirers would be

More supporters would join him as

his seniority in the Senate grew.
He still had time.

Could he profit from the mistakes of the first

effort?
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IV.
THE DEWEY BLITZ— 1948

"We are back in Philadelphia to nominate the next President
of the United States."— Walter Hallanan of West Virginia^It was eight years before Robert Taft made his next effort to
obtain the nomination for president.

He decided not to run in 1944,

because in that year he had to run for reelection to the Senate.
Besides, John Bricker had withdrawn from the nomination race in
1940, and Taft thought it might be a good idea if he did the same
thing in 1944.

2

Bricker started a campaign, but withdrew just before

the convention balloting, and thus allowed Dewey, now Governor of
3
New York, to gain a virtually unanimous nomination.

Taft's only

involvement at the convention in Chicago was to preside over the
deliberations of the platform committee.

4

Taft's decision not to run was surely correct.

By the fall of

1944 he found himself in a very close race for the Senate.

If he

had tried for the presidency his campaigning time in Ohio would
have been reduced.

As it turned out, he was elected by only

17,000 votes, which suggests that he needed all the time he could

^ New York Herald Tribune, 22 June 1948, p. 1.
^ New York Times, 5 December 1942, p. 32; 6 December 1942, p. 36;
26 August 1943, p. 16; James T. Patterson, M r . Republican: A Biography
of Robert A. Taft, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), pp. 268-71.
3

Official Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-third
Republican National Convention, (Washington, D.C.: Judd & Detweiler,
1944, p. 193.
^ Ibid., pp. 135,ff.
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get for campaigning in Ohio."*
Taft's new Senate term would last until 1950.

A presidential

election would take place in 1948, and if he decided to run, the
Senator could do so without the fear of losing his office.

Many factors

would affect his decision to run: the other Republican candidates, the
position of the Democratic Party, and his record in the Senate.

If

he felt that conditions were right, Taft would yield to the pull of
his ambition and enter the campaign.
By the spring of 1945 a series of events began which seemed to
brighten prospects for the Republican Party.

Harry S. Truman became

president on the death of Franklin Roosevelt, and the first year of
his administration was full of controversy and crisis.
that it was time for a change?

Apparently it did.

Did this mean

When the votes

were counted in the 1946 elections, the Republicans had substantial
majorities in both houses of Congress— an occurrence not seen since
the Hoover administration.

This success, coupled with a certain lack

of confidence in the Truman administration on the part of many voters,
gave Republicans cause for optimism toward the 1948 election.
For Taft the opening of the eightieth Congress meant another
step in a continuing rise to power within the Senate.

Republican

colleagues elected him chairman of the G.O.P. Policy Committee, and
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

Though he was not in name

majority leader, it was generally agreed among correspondants and
party professionals that Taft was the man to see when influence was

^ Patterson, p. 278. The vote was: Taft, 1,500,809; Pickrel
(the Democratic candidate), 1,483,069.
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needed on a critical matter.^

Taft was in a key position to put through

Congress a program supported by the Republicans.
of the credit if it were successful.

He could take much

What better platform from which

to make a bid for the presidential nomination.
Election fever began to spread early.

On December 17, 1946,

Harold E. Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota, declared that even
though it was almost two years before the election, he was an active
candidate for the Republican nomination in 1948.^

On the other hand,

when reporters asked Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg if he were going
to be an active candidate in 1948, the Senator responded that he would
not be, and the only way he would accept nomination was by a genuine
draft— a position which he maintained until the end of the convention,
despite constant effort by supporters to make him a candidate.

Q

One

week later there were rumors that two other potential candidates, Taft,
and newly elected Senator from Ohio, John Bricker, would meet to decide
which, if either, was to make a bid in 1948.

9

This extremely early activity was not shared by one other likely
candidate: Thomas E. Dewey, Governor of New York.

The young D.A.

of the 1940 campaign had matured politically, and though he had been
defeated by President Roosevelt in 1944, he still commanded support

^ Patterson, pp. 335-36; William S. White, The Taft Story,
(New York: Harper, 1954), pp. 55-57.
^ New York Times, 18 December 1946, p. 1.
® Ibid.; Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator
Vandenberg, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), pp. 421-36.
9 New York Times, 24 December 1946, p. 1; 25 December 1946, p. 1.
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within the Republican Party.^

Political observers would watch Dewey'

activities carefully because by convention time, if not before, his
supporters might have to be reckoned with.
Whether a member of Congress or not, the possible candidates had
to be aware of the program which emerged from the capitol.

It could

give the best clue as to how the G.O.P. might run the country should
one of its number be elected President.

All the candidates had to

act and speak carefully, lest the outcome of the eightieth Congress
make their position untenable within Republican circles.
The era of the eightieth Congress— 1947-48— was characterized
by sharp disagreements between the Truman administration and the
Republican majority.

The scope of this paper does not allow a lengthy

discussion of these problems.

It must be said, however, that a major

point of contention was the Taft-Hartley labor law which was passed
over Truman's veto.

Taft sponsored the Bill, and therefore bore the

brunt of the criticism from labor unions— criticism which made Taft
even more controversial than he already w a s . ^

Within the Republican

Party, however, there was a strong belief that Taft had gained
politically because of his stand on the labor legislation.

One

observer suggested that Taft demonstrated that he was big enough to
tackle a dirty job which needed to be done, and that Republicans

^

New York Times, 6 November 1946, p. 2; 18 December 1946, p. 3.

^ Patterson, pp. 354-62; Frank A. Burd, "Robert A. Taft, and
the American Understanding of Politics," (Unpublished Ph.D. Disserta
tion: University of Chicago, 1969), pp. 202,ff; Pauline Helen Isaacson
"Robert Alfonzo Taft: An Assessment of a Persuader,” (Unpublished
Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Minnesota, 1956), pp. 293-95.
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would respect him for this quality.

12

Encouraged by this latter view,

and undaunted by labor protests and pickets, the Senator continued to
make plans to run.
In March 1947 Taft received a piece of welcome news from his
native state.

Ohio leaders had met and decided that Taft would be

the strongest candidate from Ohio for the nomination— a decision which
suggested the possibility of Bricker’s imminent withdrawal.I3

Four

months later he did so.
The occasion Bricker chose was a gathering of 1300 Ohio Republicans
for a dinner in Columbus.

The junior Senator told reporters that he

was not a candidate, and urged Taft to become one— with the promise
that he would support him to the utmost.^

The next day the

Republicans who represented the Buckeye State in Congress, and the
Central Executive Committee of the State Party came out in support
of Taft's candidacy.

The Senator responded by saying:

I owe any political progress I have made to the hard work
and the assistance of the Republicans in Ohio, and I cannot
adequately express my gratitude to them. I am planning a
vacation in Canada, and then a speaking trip to the Pacific
coast. In the meantime I shall try to sound out public
sentiment throughout the country to determine whether there
is a good probability of my nomination and election. I shall
make a definite reply to the Committee in early October.15
After spending August and the first week in September at
Murray Bay, Quebec, Taft began his western trip.

It is an under

12 New York Times, 25 June 1947, p. 3.
13 Ibid., 29 March 1947, p. 32; 30 March 1947, p. 2.
14 Ibid., 29 July 1947, p. 2; 31 July 1947, p. 1.
I3 Ibid., 1 August 1947, p. 8.
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statement to say the trip was controversial.

In his first press

conference on September 12 the Senator was asked what should be done
about rising food prices.

His cryptic answer was, "Eat less."

received front page headlines in the next day's newspapers.
inept act was followed by others.
in San Francisco.

16

This
This

He needlessly crossed a picket line

Then he was noticed napping at a football game

between the Universities of Oregon and Texas.

Worst of all, during a

demonstration by tomato throwing, sign carrying C.I.O. pickets in
Seattle, a nervous aide closed a car door on Taft's hand.

All of these

acts received more than their share of newsprint.17
The trip was not a complete failure.

After his speech at Tacoma,

Washington, about halfway through the tour, no more pickets appeared
to harass him.

His dogged tenacity won out, since large segments of

influential opinion held that his trip was, despite some slip-ups,
a success.16
Taft also saw the trip as being successful.

On October 24, 1947,

three weeks after returning to Washington, he declared his candidacy
by saying:
On July 31 you handed me the resolution adopted that day
by the Republican State Central and Executive Committee
of Ohio stating that: "If Senator Robert A. Taft will
permit his name to be submitted to the electorate as a
candidate for the presidency...the Committee...pledges its
full support and its every effort toward bringing about
the nomination of Senator Taft in June 1948..." I expressed

16 new York Times, 13 September 1947, p. 1; Patterson, pp. 379.

^ Noel George Rapp, "The Political Speaking of SenatorRobert A.
Taft," (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis: Purdue University, 1955), pp. 122-23;
Isaacson, p. 294; Patterson, p. 380.
I® Rapp, p. 125; New York Times, 14 December 1947, 4: p. 7.
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at that time my deep sense of gratitude and appreciation
for the action of the Committee. You explained that
because of the situation created by the peculiar election
statutes of Ohio, you had to have a reply to your proposal
before November in order that the Committee might proceed
with the selection of candidates for delegates to the
Republican National Convention. I shall be glad to per
mit my name to be submitted as a candidate for the
presidency and accept the support of the Republican
State Central and Executive Committee.19
Taft continued by conceding that the race for the nomination was
wide-open, and that many good Republicans were in the running.

He

also pointed out that he would not be able to run an extensive
campaign because: "my first and pressing obligation in 1948 is to my
work

as a United States Senator."2®

any

p r im a r ie s

not

oppose their action.

As a result he would not enter

unless friends submitted his name; in that case he would
He concluded by saying that much of the

burden of his campaign would have to fall on his friends, and for
the

purpose of coordinating their activities, hedesignated the two

members of the Republican National Committee from Ohio, Clarence J.
2i
Brown and Mrs. Katherine Kennedy Brown, to act as his managers. i
Taft realized that he would not be unopposed for the nomination.
Dewey was not as yet a declared candidate.

Though he seemed to many

to be the front runner for the nomination, Taft was confident of
defeating him: "My general conclusion is that Dewey is fairly easy
to beat," he wrote, though: "I have to overcome the resistance to
myself arising from the claim that I cannot be elected if nominated."22

^

New York Times, 24 October 1947, p. 3.

20 Ibid., p. 1, 3.
21 Ibid.
22 Patterson, p. 382.
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The claim which Taft referred to was one made fay many liberal
Republicans.

The reasons were similar to those in 1940: image,

press and public relations, and stand on issues.

As former Congress

man Bruce Barton of New York put it: "Much as I admire Taft, I do
not believe he can be nominated.

His place is in the S e n a t e . "23

Congressman Angier Goodwin of Massachusetts suggested one of Taft's
problems by writing:
I have for the past year served on a special Joint
Committee with the Senator and as a result of sitting
in on these meetings, I doubt very much whether any
House member feels that the Senator even knows those
who serve...with him. This is something which the
Senator probably cannot help, but apparently the people
feel he lacks something by way of friendliness of
personality.24
On the other hand there were many in the Republican Party who
supported Taft for the nomination.

Among them was the undaunted,

isolationist publisher of the Chicago Tribune, Colonel Robert R.
McCormick.

While making a visit to the Far East, the redoubtable

publisher said that Taft was his first choice because, "He is right
in there on the firing line."

"Let's not have foreigners like

Thomas E. Dewey or Arthur H. Vandenberg.

Let's have an American this

time.
The Colonel had a very narrow view of Americanism, an attitude
not shared by Taft.

Both men represented the feeling of many Repub

licans that Eastern, internationalist elements within the party should

25 Patterson, p. 404.
Ibid., p. 402.
25 New York Times, 25.December 1947, p. 22.
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not be permitted to impose their views on fellow Republicans.
McCormick, like many other backers of Taft, was more conserv
ative than the Senator.

Conservative Republicans did not approve of

some of the liberal legislation in the fields of health, education
and housing which Taft sponsored, but they had nowhere else to go.
Dewey, Stassen and Vandenberg were unacceptable because of their inter
nationalism, and no other conservative could run as effectively as
Ta ft.^

Taft and Stassen had to wait until January 16, 1948 before

Thomas E. Dewey made official the fact that he too was seeking the
presidential nomination.

How active would he be?

The Governor allowed

his press secretary, James C. Hagerty, to make the announcement of
candidacy.

Hagerty said, "the Governor... is fully engaged with the

work of a legislative session, and cannot actively seek the nomination
of his party for President.

If nominated he would accept."27

Dewey's

announcement coincided with the entry of his name in the Oregon
presidential primary to be held in May.

It completed the statements

of those who would actively work for the nomination.
Delegates to national nominating conventions are selected by
various methods— a few states have primaries, others state conventions,
and still others allow the Party State Committee to choose the delegates.
The primaries receive the most attention from the press.

This is

especially true when two or more candidates have their names entered,

26 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "His Eyes have Seen the Glory,"
Colliers 119 (12 February 1947): 39-40; Irwin Ross, The Loneliest
Campaign. (New York: New American Library, 1968), pp. 35-6; Chicago
Tribune, 25 May 1948, p. 18; 28 May 1948, p. 12; 1 June 1948, p. 12.
27 Mew York Times, 17 January 1948, p. 1.
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thus creating a clear-cut contest.

Some primaries allow the voters to

make not only a choice among candidates for delegate, but also a
preference as to a choice for the nomination.

If a candidate does

well in several of these preliminary contests, he may not win the
support of many delegates, but he will bring his vote getting ability
to the attention of party leaders— and thus make himself an important
OO

force at convention time. °
The 1948 campaign was, in some ways, similar to previous campaigns.
As in the past, most of the states selected convention delegates by
means other than the primary.

This did not change the fact that press

coverage would, as previously, center on the key primary states.
1948 there were five of these:

In

New Hampshire in March; Wisconsin and

Nebraska in April; and Ohio and Oregon in May.

If one of the leading

candidates did well in all of these primaries, he would have a strong
claim on the nomination at convention time.
Though the New Hampshire primary on March 8 was to be held first,
interest centered for a time in late January on the Ohio primary to
be held May 4.

The reason was that Stassen decided that he would

invade Taft's home state to try to pick up support.

The former Governor

of Minnesota looked over the situation in Ohio in the middle of January.
His campaign organizer in the Buckeye State was Earl Hart, a native
of the state, who traveled in many areas collecting signatures for a
Stassen bid in the primary.

He must have been encouraged by what he

found for on January 25 Stassen announced that he would challenge Taft.

Paul T. David; Ralph M. Goldman; and Richard C. Bane, The
Politics of National Party Conventions, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1960), pp. 529-556.
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He told a press conference:
I have decided, after careful thought, to give my consent
to the filing of delegates in my name in the presidential
primary in Ohio...I have a high regard for Senator Robert
A. Taft, and a sincere respect for his ability and his
leadership within the Republican Party, but the differences
between us on both foreign and domestic policies represent
the major issues within the Republican Party and before the
country. It is important that the people have an opportunity
to express their views on these policies prior to the con
vention next June. I would much prefer that such a test be
made in some other state, but it now appears that the only
opportunity to present these issues for decision by the
people through ballots will be in the state of O h io . 29
This announcement may have been a surprise to the public though
not to Taft.

The two candidates met the previous Saturday at Stassen's

request, at the Statler Hotel in Washington.

At that time the Ohio

Senator told the former Governor of Minnesota that it would be a mis
take to enter the Ohio primary.

A primary fight would divide the

Party, and Stassen would be hurt.
who stirred up party factionalism.
from making the race.

The Old Guard did not like candidates
30

Taft could not dissuade Stassen

He reacted to Stassen's move by saying:

I believe Stassen made a great mistake from his own stand
point in filing in Ohio, contrary to the usual practice of
those interested in maintaining Republican Party harmony...
He has...every right to enter...but if a primary battle
ground must be chosen, I am delighted he has selected Ohio
where he has no chance of success.31
On the surface it seemed that Stassen was gambling by entering
the primary.

Closer examination suggests that the former Governor

was hedging his bet.

^

Ohio was electing fifty-three convention dele-

New York Times, 25 January,1948, p. 1, .3.

3® Ibid., 27 January 1948, p. 10.
31 Ibid., p. 1.
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gates.

Of these, nine were elected "at large," and two were chosen

in each of the state's twenty-two congressional districts.

Stassen

entered only one candidate for delegate at large, and twenty-two
delegates, in eleven carefully chosen areas for district delegate.
Stassen's candidate for delegate at large was Carrington T. Marshall,
a well known former Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court.

The

Minnesotan's supporters hoped that Marshall’s name on the ballot
along with nine Taft supporters would create confusion in the minds of
the voters, and thus allow Marshall to be elected as a convention
delegate.

Stassen's district delegates ran in areas where the "labor"

vote was heavy on the theory that labor would be opposed to the Senator
because of Taft-Hartley, and that the union members would vote accord
ingly.

Primarily urban areas were selected: Cleveland, Akron, Canton,

Youngstown, Toledo, and Dayton.

Stassen supporters also ran in the

rural coal mining district of southeastern Ohio.

32

Stassen felt that his fight in Ohio was worth the risk; defeating
Taft on his home ground would be quite an accomplishment.

A victory

in the Buckeye State might give him valuable support from Party
professionals— support which had not been forthcoming in great quantities
in late January.33
Stassen was not the only gambler in early 1948.

He was joined

by Taft who had a play forced on him when Raymond A. McConnell, Jr.,
a Lincoln, Nebraska newspaper editor, made certain that all announced

32 New York Times, 28 January 1948, p. 12. The New York Times,
2 May 1948, p. 12, contains a map of the contested districts in Ohio.
33 Ross, pp. 46-7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67
and unannounced aspirants for the Republican nomination were placed on
the ballot of the Nebraska primary for April 13.

McConnell was taking

advantage of a 1911 law which required that only one hundred signatures
from each congressional district were necessary to place the name of a
presidential candidate on the ballot.

The knowledge or consent of the

candidate was not required; and once his name was entered in the primary,
there was no way in which it could be withdrawn.^
This development made Taft change his plans.

Originally, he

intended to enter only the Ohio primary, now he was forced to campaign
in Nebraska.

A poor showing in any middle western primary would be

a hard blow to his chances for the nomination.
however.

He had two assets,

The first was the location of the state in the

an area where he could expect considerable support.

The

Middle West—
second was the

support of Nebraska Senator Hugh Butler and his organization.

Observers

believed that this powerful organization would bring many votes to
Taft on primary d a y . ^

The gambles of January would not

payoffs until April and May.

result in

In the meantime, much would occur:

primaries in New Hampshire and Wisconsin would help to determine the
wisdom of the campaign risks.
By this time the primary lineup was known.

Dewey was entered in

four, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Oregon, of the five
primaries.

o/:
Stassen was in all five, while Taft was in only two. °

^ Ross, pp. 44-45; Rapp, pp. 137-38; New York Times, 28 January
1948, p. 10.
35 Jules Abells, Out of the Jaws of Victory, (New York: Henry
Holt & Co., 1959), p. 51; Patterson, pp. 404-05.
^

Christian Science Monitor, 9 March 1948, p. 1.
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The Ohio Senator sat on the sidelines and watched as his rivals fought
it out in New Hampshire and Wisconsin.

Taft was not inactive.

In

early February he traveled through the central part of the country,
and made speeches in Illinois, Nebraska and Minnesota.37

At Omaha,

Nebraska, he made another of his politically ill advised statements
when he called for lower price supports for farm products while
speaking to an agriculturally oriented

a u d ie n c e .

This speech had

little effect at the time, though it may have hurt his showing in the
April primary.

In March, Taft traveled to New England though this

was only a brief tour because his duties in the Senate kept him
fully occupied.

39

Most of the campaigning in the early months of 1948 was done by
Stassen.

He spent many days seeking delegates in New Hampshire, and

while in the area, he made a side trip to Maine.

Most observers

thought that the former Governor would, at best, get only two of
New Hampshire's eight votes.

Any more than this would be a victory for

him and a defeat for Dewey.40

The professional observers were

accurate in their forecasts of the New Hampshire result.
six delegates, and Stassen two.

Dewey won

The result was inconclusive.

37 Christian Science Monitor, 13 February 1948, p. 3; Cincinnati
Enquirer, 11 February 1948, p. 1; 15 February 1948, p. 50; New York
Times, 12 February 1948, p. 7; 14 February 1948, p. 7.
3** Patterson, pp. 387, 389, 405.

39 Christian Science Monitor, 12 March 1948, p. 4; 15 March 1948,
p. 1; 16 March 1948, p. 1.
40 ibid., 26 January 1948, p. 1; 28 January 1948, p. 5; 1 March
1948, p. 2; 10 March 1948, p. 1.
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Wisconsin was the next stop.41
The situation in Wisconsin was complicated by the fact that the
name of General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, was on the ballot.
The voters would not be making a clear choice between Dewey and
Stassen.

It was anyone's guess as to how the General's candidacy

would affect the showing of the other two contenders.

/O

This un

certainty was felt by Dewey because for the first time he left Albany
to campaign.

Previously, he had believed that he was strong enough

within the Republican Party that it would not be necessary for him to
go out and work for the nomination.
campaign staff.

That job could be done by his

All of this went by the board in early April.43

Dewey spent three days in Wisconsin during the week of the
primary on April 6.

The last minute effort was of little help to him,

for when the votes were counted Stassen won nineteen delegates and
MacArthur eight.

Not a single Dewey supporter was elected.

Only his

prestige within the Party, and the distrust which the professionals
showed for Stassen, kept Dewey in the race after this debacle.44
Dewey had not expected to do well in Wisconsin, running, as he put it,
against: "two favorite sons" (MacArthur was born in Wisconsin and
Stassen was from neighboring Minnesota.)45

Dewey did expect to win

4*- New York Times, 11 March 1948, pp. 1, 22.
43 Ibid., 5 April 1948, p. 16; Roscoe Drummond, Christian Science
Monitor, 1 April 1948, p. 1.
43 Ibid., 29 March 1948, p. 3.
44 Ibid., 2 April 1948, p. 1; 3 April 1948, p. 1; New York Times,
8 April 1948, p. 1.
43 Leo Egan, New York Times, 8 April 1948, p. 18.
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at least two delegates and finish second in the preference'poll.
He hoped that he could regain some of his strength by a strong showing
in Nebraska.
In the week between the Wisconsin and Nebraska primaries, a great
deal of campaigning took place.

The three contenders, Taft, Stassen,

and Dewey, all made extended appearances throughout the state.

The

prize of fifteen convention delegates was small, but the momentum
which could be gained by coming in first in the preference voting
was large.

This explains the great effort which the candidates

expended in Nebraska.^
Taft was confident of success.

He told a news conference on

April 7 that organization and personal campaigning made the difference
in presidential primaries.

He had the organization, provided by

Senator Butler, and he had done a great deal of personal campaigning.^
In a three day period he made twenty-five speeches in all parts of the
s ta te.48
Butler's organization and Taft's campaigning were not enough.
When

the votes were counted on April 13, Taft was in third place.

Stassen won with 79,000 votes, Dewey was next with 63,000, while Taft
received only 23,000 votes.49

Taft released a statement which said in

48 Leo Egan, New York Times, 8 April 1948, p. 8.

^ Christian Science Monitor, 7 April.1948, p. 3.
48 Patterson, p. 404.
^

Cincinnati Enquirer, 15 April 1948, p. 1.
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part:
I am naturally disappointed about the primary result in
Nebraska...Of course Governor Dewey carried the state in
1940, and Mr. Stassen in 1944; and it is evident that we
were too optimistic in thinking that a long term strength
could be offset by four days campaigning in a distant
state. The return engagement in Ohio will produce the
opposite result.50
Roscoe Drummond of the Christian Science Monitor told his readers
that:
...Taft's poor, excruciatingly poor third, has confirmed
his own greatest apprehension and the judgment of his
political friends. That apprehension, that judgment was
that he was a weak vote getter outside his own state, and
that he probably would be the hardest Republican candidate
to elect, even against a weak and divided Democratic Party.51
Both the Senator and the reporter hit upon elements of the truth;
the former, that Stassen and Dewey were strong in Nebraska, and the
latter that there was a prevalent view among many Republican leaders
that Taft could not win if nominated.

Nebraska only confirmed the

view of this group.
The primary in Ohio now assumed much more importance than anyone
who viewed the situation in January would have thought possible.
Stassen's two victories over Dewey— victories which were incomprehens
ible to many Republican leaders— gave him momentum.

If the "boy wonder"

from Minnesota made a strong showing in Ohio, the professionals would
have to take notice of his strength.

Taft, on the other hand, was in

danger of elimination from the race.

His strength was with Party

professionals, especially those from the middle West and South.

5® New York Times, 15 April 1948, p. 4.
Christian Science Monitor, 14 April 1948, p. 1.
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he could not show them strength from his native state, they would look
for someone else to support.
Ohio saw a great deal of its senior Senator and the invading former
Governor of Minnesota in the three weeks before the primary.

Both

candidates crossed and recrossed the eleven Congressional districts
where there were delegate contests.
From the beginning, Taft went on the attack.

At Birton (near

Cleveland) he told an audience, "Mr. Stassen could have been elected
Senator two years ago, and could have been in Washington to help us
Republicans do our job.

It would have been easy.

to spend two years running for President."

52

He chose instead

Three days later he told

a gathering in Ashtabula:
I've noticed my opponent going around the country claiming
he's more liberal than I am. I would like to know in what
respect he is more liberal. More liberal in giving money
to Europe perhaps. If he can develop a more liberal program
within the principles of Republicanism than we develop^ in
Washington, I would like to know what that program is.
Stassen did not remain silent.

After campaigning in Florida for

three days he came to Ohio on April 21, and that night stated his
position in the campaign by saying:
I have some definite views on the steps Americans should
follow to implement its philosophy of freedom in the
modern world...I...have faith that if our stands are ex
posed and presented to the people in a forthright manner,
and if the people are given a chance to decide their
policies on an informed basis, America will find its way
through to better policies than can be devised in any
other manner. I have a high regard for...Robert A. Taft...
but I find myself in almost constant disagreement with
^
him on key questions of both foreign and domestic policy.

3^New York Times, 19 April 1948, p. 13.
53Ibid., 22 April 1948, p. 12.
54Ibid., p. 15.
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This speech gave Taft a chance to appeal to those who were most
loyal to him: the rock-ribbed Republican voters of Ohio.

He spent

April 22, the day after the Dayton speech, traveling through South
eastern Ohio.

When he reached Salem he attacked Stassen's speech of

the previous evening, by saying:
I have been amused by Mr. Stassen's claim
that the general
sentiment is that he wants the support of the people because
he is more liberal than I am. So far as I am concerned, my
policies are exactly those of the Republican majority in
Congress. They are the policies on which we appealed to the
people in 1946, and won. They are the policies on which, so
far as I can see, we are going to appeal to the voters in
1948. If in constant disagreement with me, he is in constant
disagreement with the Republicans in the nation, and I have
yet to find where he is actually willing to come out in the
open and say what it is he criticizes in that Republican
program.55
By April 22, the date of Taft's speech at Salem, the tone of the
campaign was set.

It never rose above this point.

But as time for

the primary election approached, a new element of controversy was
added: the question of how many delegates each candidate claimed he
could win.

When Stassen first announced that he was going to invade

Ohio, the Taft campaign staff was not worried.

Clarence Brown said:

"We will take care of that situation on May 4 in Ohio."56
April this view changed.
how many?

By late

Stassen was going to win some delegates, but

On May 1, Taft claimed that he would get all fifty-three

delegates, though he did concede that Carrington Marshall, Stassen's
candidate for delegate at large, might sneak through to victory.
Stassen, on the other hand, claimed that he would win twelve of

55 New York Times, 23 April 1948, p. 16.
56 ibid., 25 January 1948, p. 1.
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twenty-three contested delegates, and that Marshall would run better
than the average of the nine Taft supporters who were running for the
same positron. 57
The result on May 4 was not a complete victory for either
candidate, though Taft, on the whole, had the better of it.

The Senator

won fourteen of the twenty-three contested races, while Stassen won
only nine.

Carrington Marshall finished tenth in the race for dele

gate at large, and was therefore not elected.

Stassen won two dele

gates each in the districts containing Akron, Youngstown, Dayton, and
Toledo, and one delegate in a Cleveland area district.

Taft won

thirty delegates unopposed, the delegate at large race against Marshall,
and thirteen district delegates contested by Stassen.

These were:

five in the Cleveland area, and two each in Canton, Steubenville,
Springfield, and Portsmouth.

58

Reaction to the election was mixed.
Taft.

Stassen was hurt more than

The Party regulars, especially those who were in sympathy with

Taft's position, would never forgive Stassen for going against a
prominent favorite son in his native state.
slowed.

Besides, his momentum was

He did not win a sweeping victory in Ohio, and therefore his

chances were not enhanced.
Taft, on the other hand, had demonstrated that he could get votes
in industrial areas.

Even though he lost nine delegates to Stassen,

57 Chicago Tribune, 2 May 1948, p. 1; Cincinnati Enquirer, 3 May
1948, p. 1.
Chicago Tribune, 6 May 1948, pp. 1,22; New York Times, 6 May
1948, pp. 1,3.
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in one Akron contest, his candidate lost by only 192 votes.

In

addition, Democrats could (without difficulty) vote in the Republican
primary— a situation which helped Stassen and hurt Taft.
be pleased, though not overjoyed by his showing.

59

Taft could

The campaign cost

much time and money, and his opponents could claim that he should have
done better in Ohio if he were to remain in the race.
to do well— perhaps better than he did.

He was expected

Critics needed only to remind

delegates of his poor showing in Nebraska, and the talk of Taft not
being able to win began again.

With a month to go before the convention,

Taft was still in the running for the nomination.

60

The last primary took place in Oregon on May 21.
shire, the contestants were Dewey and Stassen.

As

in New Hamp

The result held great

importance because, even though only twelve delegates were being chosen,
a third defeat for Dewey would make party leaders think twice before
nominating him.

Then too there was the old saying: "You have to get to

know Tom Dewey to dislike him."

What better excuse could be found to

abandon a candidate, than a poor performance in primaries combined
with a stuffy personality. **1
Both candidates spent many hard days of campaigning in Oregon.
The highlight came in a debate heldin Portland on May 17
question of outlawing the Communist Party.

on the

Stassen took the affirm

ative, and Dewey, on constitutional grounds, the negative.

The

debate was broadcast nationally, and most observers agreed that the

^ Chicago Tribune, 6 May 1948, p. 1.
Chicago Tribune, 6 May 1948, p. 18; 7 May 1948, p. 22;
Patterson, p. 407.
61 Ross, p. 34.
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Governor of New York was more persuasive than his rival.
seemed to confirm this conclusion.

62

The voting

Oregon gave Dewey a narrow victory. J

Taft was fortunate in that the primaries of 1948 were inconclusive.
Stassen and Dewey had won two, and Taft one; each candidate had lost
at least once, and Dewey and Stassen had been defeated twice.

If any

momentum was gained throughout the futile business, it belonged to
Dewey; only because he happened to win the last primary.

In some years

Taft's unimpressive showing would have eliminated him from consideration
for the nomination.

Not in 1948, however;

his competitors had done

little better than he, and therefore, the race for the nomination was
still wide open.
The twenty-fourth Republican National Convention was scheduled to
begin in Philadelphia on June 21.

Throughout the month of June,

political activity, both in the convention city and outside it, was at
a fever pitch.

At stake was a large group of uncommitted delegates

whose votes would decide the nomination.
These delegates were pledged to favorite son candidates.
Pennsylvania had the largest block of votes in this group.

Its

seventh-three delegates were pledged to Senator Edward Martin until
released.

Not much smaller was the fifty-six vote Illinois delegation

pledged to Governor Dwight Green, and the fifty-three vote California
group which was bound to vote for Governor Earl Warren.

Also uncom

mitted were the delegations from Michigan, New Jersey, Massachusetts,.
Indiana, and several smaller states.

In all, over three hundred

^ Seymour Coreman, Chicago Tribune, 18 May 1948, p. 8; Roscoe
Drummond, Christian Science Monitor, 18 May 1948, p. 1; New York Times,
18 May 1948, p. 1.
^

Chicago Tribune, 23 May 1948, p. 1.
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delegates were uncommitted, and with the closeness of the race, they
would prove to be the deciding factor.

When the time came for those

who were uncommitted to leave their favorite sons, the convention's
balance of power would be changed with the result that a nominee would
emerge.64
Robert Taft knew that he had to convince the uncommitted delegates
that he could win in November, and thus make sure that they threw
their support to him at the proper time.

Unfortunately for the Senator

his time was taken up by the busy final hours of Congress.

Finally,

during the early morning hours of Sunday, June 20, a very sleepy Taft
drove to Philadelphia to take personal charge of his c a m p a ig n . 65
It was well that Taft was now on the scene.

His organization,

under the direction of Clarence J. Brown, was not as efficient as it
had been during the 1940 convention.

It was certainly not as efficient

as the Dewey organization, headed by three political veterans: J.
Russell Sprague, Herbert Brownell, and Edwin F. Jaeckle.

While

the

Dewey triumverate was putting their candidate's best foot forward,
by having him available to talk with delegates, and discussing with them
the advantages which they might gain by throwing their support to him,
Clarence Brown was busy with such matters as finding hotel rooms and
seats in the galleries for his friends.

There was also the matter of

finding a place for a five hundred pound baby elephant, which Taft
supporters dragged through hotel lobbies with the object, in
theory at least, of helping his candidacy.

One of the Senator's

64 Ross, pp. 91-2.
New York Herald Tribune, 21 June 1948, pp. 1, 5; Patterson,
p. 410.
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first chores on reaching Philadelphia was to shake the trunk of the
beast, in order to please photographers.

66

He was not happy doing

this kind of stunt.
With his public relations duties out of the way for the time being,
the Senator could get back to the real job of convincing the delegates
that he should be nominated.

By this time most reporters believed that

Dewey would be in the lead when the balloting began on Wednesday or
Thursday morning.

The favorite sons were holding firm, however, and

Taft was confident that he would have as many delegates as Dewey when
the balloting began.

67

The first test of strength for the Dewey and anti-Dewey forces
came on the issue of credentials.

Two rival sets of delegates from

Georgia came to the convention— both claiming to represent the real
Republican Party in the State.

One group was solidly for Dewey, the

other was just as solidly for Taft.

The week before the convention,

the Republican National Committee voted forty-eight to forty-four to
seat the faction which supported Dewey.

68

This decision was appealed

to the Convention credentials committee by the Taft and Stassen
forces.

On June 21, this body decided by a vote of twenty-six to

^ New York Herald Tribune, 21 June 1948, p. 5; Richard L. Strout,
Christian Science Monitor, 23 June 1948, p. 6; Patterson, p. 410.
^ James A. Hagerty, New York Times, 21 June 1948, p. 1; Jack
Steele, New York Herald Tribune, 20 June 1948, 2: p. 1; Ross, p. 91.
68

Jack Steele, New York Herald Tribune, 19 June 1948, p. 1;
James A. Hagerty, New York Times, 19 June 1948, p. 1.
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twenty-four to uphold the decision of the National Committee.^

At

least two members, from Illinois and Tennessee, of the credentials
committee voted for the Dewey faction (known as the Tucker Group
because its chairman was G. Roscoe Tucker) in spite of the fact that
they were Taft supporters.

They may have voted against the Taft

forces because they were Black, thus protesting the fact that the
faction of Georgia Republicans which supported the Senator excluded
Blacks from membership.

The Tucker Group, on the other hand, did

include Black delegates.^

As a result of the decision of the

credentials committee Taft lost sixteen votes which he badly needed.
The anti-Dewey forces did not appeal to the floor of the convention
because they were uncertain of their strength, and a defeat so early in
the proceedings would have had a negative psychological effect on
wavering delegates.71
Meanwhile, the convention spent two days listening to colorful
oratory; the most notable of which were the speeches of former
Congresswoman Clare Booth Luce of Connecticut, and Governor Dwight
Green of Illinois.

Both addresses used a finely knit combination of

wit, fact and sarcasm to bring the Truman administration under heavy

69 Chicago Tribune, 22 June 1948, p. 1; Jack Steele, New York
Herald Tribune, 22 June 1948, p. 3.
This is not to say that Blacks did not support Taft. Perry
Howard, leader of the small Republican Party in Mississippi is an
example to the contrary. See Patterson, p. 208.
71 William S. White, The Taft Story, (New York: Harper, 1954),
p. 121.
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attack.72

off the convention floor, the candidates continued in their

struggle to win over wavering delegates— a struggle on which the
convention oratory had little effect.
The first real development was the decision of Colonel McCormick,
publisher of the Chicago Tribune, that it would be politically expedient
to declare his support for a Taft-Stassen ticket.

The vocal and

conservative Colonel said:
I am for Taft, and I have no second choice. Vandenberg can’t
even carry Michigan...Dewey ran 250,000 votes behind the
ticket in Illinois (in 1944) and dragged a great many state
and county candidates down with him. He wouldn't do any
better this year. I don't think he can carry any more than
twelve states...Stassen is strong with young people, but
mature people think he lacks maturity. In 1900 McKinley
was nominated for his prestige and Theodore Roosevelt for
his personal popularity. Therefore it seems reasonable to
nominate Taft and Stassen for the same r e a s o n . 73
Reacting to McCormick's announcement, a Dewey supporter remarked
that it was nice to know that the Chicago Tribune ticket had finally
emerged.74
The "Chicago Tribune" ticket represented a strange coalition.
For months McCormick's mouthpiece had printed unflattering stories
about Stassen— especially in the final days of the Ohio primary
campaign.

The former Governor of Minnesota was criticized for

receiving large contributions from "Eastern internationalist" Repub-

72 Official Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth
Republican National Convention, (Washington, D.C.: Judd & Detweiler,
1948), pp. 39-51, 53-60. (hereafter referred to as Proceedings);
Christian Science Monitor, 22 June 1948, p. 7; New York Herald Tribune.
22 June 1948, p. 1.
73 Arthur Sears Henning, Chicago Tribune, 22 June 1948, p. 1.
^

New York Herald Tribune, 22 June 1948, pp. 3,5.
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licans.

The articles suggested that because of these large contribu

tions another Willkie type blitz might o c c u r . 75

Now, however, McCormick

had changed tactics; he would go along with Stassen for the vice
presidency, because it might stop Dewey and help Taft to gain the
presidential nomination.76

If the Colonel's strategy worked, the "real"

Republicans would have out-maneuvered the internationalists.
McCormick's problem was that he could not deliver many votes, and
soon his announcement of support for a Taft-Stassen ticket was over
shadowed by more important developments.

These developments began the

trend which eventually led to Dewey's nomination.
It all began on Tuesday, June 22, when Senator Edward Martin,
favorite son of the seventy-three Pennsylvania delegation announced
that he was releasing his delegates, because he had decided to support
Dewey.

This announcement caused a great stir in the Pennsylvania

delegation.

Newspaper correspondents estimated that between thirty-

five and fifty of the delegates would follow Martin's lead into the
Dewey camp.

77

On the other hand, there were some Keystone State dele

gates including Governor James H. Duff who felt that they had been
sold out by Martin's move.

The Governor said: "I started out against

Dewey, and I am going to stay that way.

The Pennsylvania delegation

is not going to collapse, and I know I will n o t . "78

7"* Walter Trohan, Chicago Tribune, 1 May 1948, p. 1; Arthur
Sears Henning, Chicago Tribune, 2 May 1948, p. 1.
76 James Reston, New York Times, 22 June 1948, p. 6.
77 Mew York Times, 23 June 1948, p. 1.
7^ Chicago Tribune, 23 June 1948, p. 1; White, pp. 122-23.
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Duff was determined not to support Dewey, but where were he and
his supporters to go?

Given a choice, the Governor would have pre

ferred Vandenberg, but the Michigan Senator was staying aloof, and so
would not be a rallying point at the beginning of any "Stop Dewey"
drive.^

He decided, therefore, at a caucus of the Pennsylvania

delegation on Wednesday night, to vote for Taft along with twentyon

seven of his colleagues. w
This was an odd state of affairs.

Martin and the faction which

supported him were the conservatives in Pennsylvania.
have been expected to support Taft.

This group might

Duff, on the other hand, was an

internationalist Republican— a strange characteristic for a Taft
supporter.

Political expediency had again played a part, and thus

forced politicians into commitments which they would normally avoid.
Four years later Martin and Duff found themselves in a more normal
alignment.
hower.

The former supported Taft, and the latter worked for Eisen-

Different circumstances demanded different alliances.

81

It

was ironic that the move of the conservative Senator Martin would lead
to the defeat of his conservative colleague, Taft.

82

Taft was disappointed by Martin's support of Dewey.
the block of favorite sons was breaking up.

^

It meant that

He therefore arranged

Chicago Tribune, 23 June 1948, p. 1.

80 Ibid., 24 June 1948, p. 3; White, p. 123.
8^ Paul T. David; Malcolm Moos; and Ralph M. Goldman, Presidential
Nominating Politics of 1952, 5 vols., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1954), 2: 267-68.
82 White, p. 122.
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meetings with Stassen, Earl Warren, and Kim Sigler, Governor of Michigan,
to find a way of stopping Dewey.
several meetings were held.

The effort was not successful, though

All of the candidates, and the managers of

candidates, thought that Dewey was still well short of the nomination.®®
As the hour for balloting drew nearer, the Dewey campaign staff increased
pressure on delegates who still supported favorite sons.
June 23, the pressure began to pay off.

On Wednesday,

About noon, Representative

Charles A. Halleck, favorite son of the twenty-nine vote Indiana dele
gation announced he and his Hoosier colleagues had all decided to vote
for Dewey on the first ballot.®^

It later turned out that Halleck was

under the impression that Dewey and his managers had offered him the
vice-presidential nomination, on the condition that all of the Indiana
delegates would support Dewey on the first ballot.

85

Later that day

Governor Alfred E. Driscoll of New Jersey indicated to reporters that
after the first ballot, the New Jersey delegation of thirty-five votes
would be free to vote for the New Yorker— and that most of them would
do so.®®

Still later, Senator James P. Kem, favorite son of Missouri's

thirty-three delegates, joined the Dewey band-wagon.

87

Wednesday was

®® New York Herald Tribune, 24 June 1948, p. 3; 27 June 1948,
2: p. 3.
84

Roscoe Drummond, Christian Science Monitor, 23 June 1948, p. 1;
New York Herald Tribune, 24 June 1948, pp. 1,3.
85

Abels, p. 65, describes how the Dewey managers promised Halleck
the vice-presidential nomination. The New York Herald Tribune, 24 June
1948, p. 1, suggested that he was the leading candidate. When the time
came for choosing the candidate, however, Dewey found the Indiana
Congres sman unacceptable.
^

Leo Egan, New York Times, 24 June 1948, p. 4.

®^ Ibid.; New York Herald Tribune, 24 June 1948, p. 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84
Dewey's day, and Che momentum of the convention was in his direction.
laft remained optimistic though chances for his nomination dimin
ished as the momentum toward Dewey increased.

He received some

encouragement when Governor Green of Illinois made official what had
been suspected for some time, that most of the state's fifty-six
votes would go to Taft on the second ballot.
Green on the first ballot.

88

set the gains made by Dewey.

They would vote for

This bit of news did not, however, off
The anti-Dewey forces were still in dis

agreement as to the strategy to be followed to stop the New Yorker.
If they could not agree soon, all their efforts would be futile, as
Dewey was getting closer to the 548 votes needed to nominate a candidate.
This fact was confirmed when

a poll of delegates was released

which showed that Dewey would receive about 420 votes on the first
ballot.

It also suggested the possibility that the Governor would

receive an additional one hundred votes on the second ballot.
would put him very close to the majority needed for nomination.

This
The

poll indicated that the best Taft could get was 220 votes on the first
ballot, with a net gain of fifty votes on the second.

Stassen would

OQ

lose several votes on the second ballot,

although he would still have

about 150 votes, enough to affect the outcome if Dewey could be held
below 500 votes.
By Wednesday evening the Convention was ready to listen to the long

^ Arthur Sears Henning, Chicago Tribune, 24 June 1948, p. 1;
George Tagge, Chicago Tribune, 24 June 1948, p. 2.
89 Christian Science Monitor, 23 June 1948, p. 7.
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process of placing names in nomination.

In 1948 this speech making

lasted until 4 a.m. and seven names: Dewey, Taft, Warren, Stassen,
Vandenberg, MacArthur, and Senator Raymond E. Baldwin of Connecticut,
were presented.^0
Taft's name was presented to the convention by his Senate colleague
John Bricker.
are not.

The speech was not noteworthy— >most nominating speeches

The concluding paragraph, however, suggests the loyalty which

large numbers of Republicans gave to Robert Taft.

Bricker said:

I give to you a man of great faith~a faith in divine guidance,
a faith in his government, a faith in his fellow man, and a
faith in himself. He has the vision of the ultimate destiny
of the Republic both at home and in world affairs. Under his
leadership this Republic can lead the world into the dawn of
that great day of peace on earth and good will among men...
I nominate...one whom all Americans proclaim a great man...
Robert A. Taft.91
Thursday, June 24, was the day of the balloting.

The afternoon was

hot and both delegates and reporters looked very undignified by the time
it was over.

As was expected, Dewey took an early lead, and by the end

of the first ballot, he had 434 votes to Taft's 2 2 4 . ^

Stassen had

157 votes, with the rest going to numerous favorite sons.

The New York

Governor was only 114 votes short of gaining the nomination.
Taft had done about as well as the Associated Press poll of
delegates had suggested.

He received votes from thirty states, Alaska

90 Christian Science Monitor, 24 June 1948, p. 1; Proceedings,
pp. 189, ff.
^

Proceedings, p. 218.

92 ibid., p. 258.
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Hawaii and Puerto Rico.

The largest blocks which he received were:

forty-four from Ohio, thirty from Texas, and twenty-nine from Pennsyl
vania.

He also received the unanimous support of the South Carolina

and Mississippi delegations, as well as both votes from Puerto Rico.
The trouble was that the Senator was over two hundred votes behind
Dewey, and the Governor was close to the nomination.
The second ballot did nothing to improve Taft's position.
picked up eighty-one votes to reach a total of 515.

Dewey

While Taft added

fifty to come in second with 274, he had lost ground, and now Dewey
was only thirty-three votes short of the nomination.

The Senator's

gain came from Illinois, where, as promised, Governor Green released
the delegation.

He also picked up most of the twenty vote Tennessee

delegation which voted for B. Carroll Reece on the first ballot, though
this gain was offset by losses to Dewey in other parts of the country.
The other candidates were getting nowhere.
or their totals had remained the same.

93

They had either lost votes

If there was going to be a

stop-Dewey movement, it appeared that Taft would have to be the man
to lead it.
At this point in the proceedings, many of the leaders, who looked
for a formula by which Dewey could be stopped, approached the platform
to consult with each other as to what their next move should be.

They

decided to seek an adjournment so that the delegations who still sup
ported favorite sons could caucus and discuss their strategy on the
third ballot.
There were still three crucial delegations: California with fifty-

Proceedings, p. 262.
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three votes, Michigan with forty-one, and Connecticut with nineteen.
California or Michigan could put Dewey over on the third ballot, while
Connecticut could get Dewey close.

Governor Duff made the adjournment

motion, and after many shouts of "no, no!" the chairman of the New
York delegation gained recognition to state that there was no objec
tion to the motion so far as his delegation was concerned.9^

With

that, the motion of Governor Duff was approved.9^
Taft watched the convention from his hotel room.

After the

adjournment he told reporters that it still looked wide open, and that
the adjournment showed that Dewey forces were not confident of con
trolling the convention.98

Clarence Brown was less explicit: "T

I'm just so damned tired, I don't k n o w . "97

don't know!

ike difficulty

was that there was so little time, and so little room in which to
maneuver.

Senator Baldwin of Connecticut had tried to hold off the

announcement of the result of the second ballot in order to find
Warren and Governor Kim Sigler of Michigan, Vandenberg's leading
supporter, to let them know that he was releasing the Connecticut
QQ

delegation from its commitment.

He failed in this effort,

but

Connecticut would probably go to Dewey on the third ballot, and so
would enough votes from California and Michigan to make the ballot

^

New York Times, 24 June 1948, pp. 1,3.

9^ Proceedings, p. 268.
96 Ross, p. 106.
97 New York Herald Tribune, 25 June 1948, p. 5.
98 Ibid.
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a formality.

Taft's only hope was to convince Stassen to withdraw

and give the Senator his support.

Stassen wouldn't, however, release

his delegates until the end of the third ballot, and as far as Taft
was concerned that would be too late.
there was nothing left but to concede.

He decided, therefore, that
99

When the convention reconvened, Senator Bricker was the first
to be recognized.

He read a statement written by Taft which said:

A careful analysis of the situation shows that a majority
of the delegates will support Governor Dewey on the third
ballot. I therefore release my delegates and ask them to
vote for Governor Dewey with all of their force and enthu
siasm, and I hope the selection will be unanimous. I am
deeply grateful for the support which has been given me by
so many loyal friends. I congratulate Governor Dewey on
his nomination. I shall support him in his campaign with
all the force and enthusiasm in my power. He is a great
Republican, and he will be a great Republican P r e s i d e n t . 100
The rest was inevitable.

One after another, Stassen, Warren,

Vandenberg, Baldwin and MacArthur all withdrew and urged support for
Dewey.

The Governor of New York was then nominated unanimously.

He

became the first Republican candidate who had lost in a previous
presidential election to be renominated.
Robert Taft had again lost the nomination.

What began as a very

promising attempt for the presidency ended in a second place finish.
One must look at Taft's poor showing in the two primaries which he
entered for the main cause of his defeat in 1948.

His performance

suggested that he could not win, and his statements opposing higher
subsidies for farm products in a speech in Nebraska, and urging

99 Ross, p. 107.
100 proceedings, p. 272.
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people to eat less to cut inflation, gave the impression that he
would be hard to elect against any Democrat.

This view was especially

prevalent on the East Coast, where the Senator received the least
support.
Taft still had his valuable position of leadership in the Senate.
He also had many supporters and friends in the South and Middle West.
If the Eastern candidate, Dewey, should go the same way as he did
in 1944, and as Willkie did in 1940, his friends could claim that the
Republicans should try a new strategy in 1952.

The strategy would

include an appeal to those who had not voted; those who were satisfied
with neither candidate in 1948; those who were more conservatively
minded, and those who were more interested in domestic affairs.

If

the opportunity for this appeal should come, Robert Taft, if he was
reelected to the Senate in 1950, would be the natural spokesman to
answer the call of middle American Republicans.

He, in short, would

get another opportunity to seek the presidential nomination.
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V.
THE END OF THE QUEST:
CHICAGO; JULY, 1952
When my friend Tom Dewey was the candidate in 1948 and
in 1944, I tried to be one of his best campaigners.
And you ask him whether or not I didn't go into eighteen
states one year and twenty-three states the next. Re
examine your hearts before you take this action in
support of the minority report, because we followed you
before, and you took us down the path to defeat.—
Everett M. Dirksen^
As Thomas E. Dewey gave his acceptance speech to the
delegates and guests of the 1948 Republican National Convention,
Robert Taft stepped out of his hotel room to talk with friends
and reporters.

He told them that he had made his last attempt

to gain the Republican presidential nomination.

The statement was

made in good faith, since he had every reason to believe that Dewey
would be elected in November, and not leave the White House until
1956, at which time Taft would be sixty-six years old, too old
to seek the nomination.

Taft supporters, and members of the press

all remembered the moment as sad.^
The sadness of Taft's supporters proved premature.
confidence in Dewey’s chances turned out to be misplaced.
in part to a low key,

Taft's
Owing

bland campaign, in part to a strenu

ous attack by Truman on the record of that "do nothing eightieth

^ Official Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth
Republican National Convention, (Washington, D. C.: Judd &
Detweiler, 1952),p. 178.
^ James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A.
Taft, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1972), p. 415; New York Herald
Tribune, 25 June, 1948, p. 3; Chicago Tribune, 25 June, 1948, p. 2.
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Congress," Dewey was defeated.

Millions of voters believed that there

was little difference between the candidates.
stayed away from the polls in large numbers.

As a result, voters
Taft believed that had

Dewey waged a more aggressive campaign more Republicans would have
come to the polls.

The Senator pointed out that only thirty thousand

additional Republican votes in California, Illinois, and Ohio would
have been necessary to elect Dewey.^

To Taft, an aggressive campaign

meant the defense of the eightieth Congress and the principles of
conservatism which its record represented.

It also meant repudiation

of the New Deal and the Fair Deal, a step which, thought Taft, would
meet with the approval of most Americans.^
Dewey had practically ignored Taft during the campaign, with the
result that the Republican Party still found itself in a dilemma.
Since 1933, when Franklin Roosevelt began his New Deal, the
Republican Party had been t o m between the view of liberals that the
party should out-promise the Democrats, and conservatives like Taft
who believed that the Party should repudiate all that the New Deal
stood for; big government, deficit spending, and the erosion of
individual freedom.

The conservatives believed that their party

should adhere to the principles of liberty, equality for all, and

^Patterson, p. 425. Samuel Lubell in The Future of American
Politics. 3rd ed., (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 215-17,
suggests that the light vote of 1948 resulted from a lack of support
for either Truman or Dewey.
^Patterson, pp. 421-25.
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peace— principles on which the party had been founded.

They also

pointed out that liberals had been nominated in 1940, 1944, and 1948
without achieving victory.

They believed that in 1952, a different

approach should be tried— an approach which would avoid trying to
outbid the Democrats.^
Disagreements among Republicans were not restricted
policy.

to domestic

During the first session of the eighty-first Congress Taft

found himself voting with the minority of his colleagues on questions
of foreign policy, notably the ratification of the North Atlantic
Pact, and its implementing legislation.^

He worried about a head

long rush toward involving ourselves in the defense of Europe on
very little pretext.
In addition to problems of public policy Taft was also confronted
with the task of being reelected to the Senate in 1950.

He faced an

active campaign waged by large labor unions in Ohio which never for
gave the Senator for his sponsorship of the Taft-Hartley labor law.
Labor's candidate was Auditor of Ohio, Joseph T. Ferguson.

Though

Ferguson was a good auditor, his speeches on domestic and foreign
policy suggested that he was far out of his depth when discussing
these matters.

7

^Russell Kirk, and James McClellan, The Political Principles of
Robert A. Taft, (New York: Fleetwick Press, 1967), pp. 54-7.
^Congressional Record 81st Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 9915-16, 13168.
7Lubell, pp. 183-87; Richard Leroy Custer, "Robert A. Taft and
the 1952 Republican Presidential Nomination," (Unpublished Masters
Thesis, Ohio State University, 1965), pp. 21-2.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Taft spent a great amount of time and money to counter the
vicious campaign against him.

In the end he was successful.

He

defeated Ferguson by 431,000 votes— the largest margin of victory
in an Ohio senatorial race to that time.

Taft did quite well in the

industrial areas of the state, carrying Cuyahoga County— which con
tains Cleveland— for the first and only time in his political career.
The size of Taft's victory in 1950 encouraged many conservative
Republicans who saw the Senator as the leading candidate for 1952.
He had shown considerable vote getting ability in an industrial state
an ability which many of his detractors doubted that he had.
Moderate and liberal Republicans were still not impressed with
Taft's showing in Ohio.
licanism.

They simply did not like his brand of Repub

They were more willing to improve on the programs of the

Democrats than to wipe the slate clean and use their own methods.
Since they realized that Taft would be the logical candidate of the
conservatives in 1952, they began to search for an alternative
candidate.

Their thinking became apparent when Governor Thomas E.

Dewey appeared on the October 15, 1950 edition of the Meet the Press
television program.

The Governor made it clear that he would not be

the standard bearer for the liberals in 1952.

He had tried twice,

and failed both times.

This was only part of the thinking of the

^Patterson, p. 469.
1,214,459.

The vote was: Taft, 1,645,643; Ferguson,
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liberals.

The most significant part of the program was Dewey's

remark:
We have in New York a very great figure; the President
of Columbia University; one of the greatest soldiers
of history; and a man who really understands the problems
of the world. If I should have influence with the New
York delegation, I should recommend to them that they
should support General (Dwight D.) Eisenhower, if he would
accept the nomination.^
Dewey was not the first to realize that Eisenhower could be
made President of the United States.

As early as 1948, both

Democrats and Republicans considered the General as a possible
candidate.
time.

Eisenhower refused to be drawn into politics at that

He wrote a letter to Leonard V. Finder, publisher of the

Manchester, (New Hampshire) Evening Leader in which he gave his
opinion that life-long soldiers should not, ordinarily, seek high
political office.

The General qualified his position by adding

that over riding circumstances might intervene to make it necessary
for a military man to run for civilian o f f i c e . ^
stances had occurred in 1948.

n 0 such circum

Eisenhower's letter had the effect of

removing his name from serious consideration.
As soon as the 1948 election was over, however, speculation
began concerning the nominees in 1952.

Chairman of the Republican

National Committee, Representative Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania said

T. David; Malcolm Moos; and Ralph M. Goldman, Presidential
IjQininating Politics in 1952, 5 Vols., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1954), 1: 25.
^Paul

l^Leonard Lurie, The King Makers, (New York: Coward, McCann, and
Geoghegan, 1971), p. 5.
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one month after the election, that in his opinion the contest for
the nomination in 1952 would be between Taft and Eisenhower
Dewey's statement on Meet the Press went a considerable distance
toward making a prophet of Scott.
Taft and his fellow conservatives admired Eisenhower's military
record, though when it came to a choice among generals, they preferred
Douglas MacArthur, since he agreed with the hard line which they had
taken on questions involving the Far East.
not trust Eisenhower.

The conservatives did

They did not know where he stood on many

issues of the day, but they knew that the Republican party had lost
with Willde and Dewey, and they were concerned that the same elements
within the party that had supported these men were also rallying to the
support of Eisenhower.

Conservatives knew where Taft stood on the

issues, and he seemed to be their logical candidate in 1952.
Taft began early in 1951 to examine his prospects for the
upcoming contest.

12

His first step was to send two of his most

valued friends and supporters, David S. Ingalls

of Cleveland, and

Ben E. Tate of Cincinnati, on a fact-finding trip throughout the
nation.

Their task was to weigh the existing sentiment and to

assess the chances for support of a majority of the convention
delegates.

UDavid, Moos, and Goldman, 1: 23.
•^Patterson, pp. 504-05; Custer, p. 22; Pauline Helen Isaacson,
"Robert Alfonzo Taft: an Assessment of a Persuader," (Unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1956), pp. 301-03.
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While Ingalls and Tate were on their travels, Taft was reacting
to the boom for Eisenhower.

He let it be known to close friends "the

General will be nominated only over the body of my dead hopes."13
In an effort to minimize the differences between himself and the
liberals in his Party, he tried to be conciliatory on many domestic
issues.

He reversed his position of 1948 by supporting higher price

supports for farmers.

He reasoned that Dewey had done poorly in

agricultural areas, and that his support of a program dear to the
hearts of farmers would aid his chances in these areas.

In addition

he joined with Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota in sponsoring
amendments to the Taft-Hartley law.

Most surprising of all was Taft's

view that, because of high defense expenditures, deficit financing
would be necessary for several more years.^
Though Taft tried to show moderation on many issues, the
liberals still pressed Eisenhower to run.

The information supplied

by Tate and Ingalls early in 1951, however, suggested that he could
still be nominated.

He was the candidate of organization Republicans

in the South and Middle West, and, said Ingalls and Tate, he was sure
of 400 of the 604 delegates which would be needed for nomination at
the convention.^

l%oel George Rapp, "The Political Speaking of Senator Robert
A. Taft," (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Purdue University, 1955), pp.
157-158.
■^Patterson, pp. 503-04.
l^Ibid., p. 505; Rapp, p. 159.
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Though encouraged by the reports of his friends, the Senator
still hesitated to declare his candidacy.
the well being of his wife.

His chief concern was

From the time of his first campaign for

public office, Martha Bauers Taft had been a great political asset.
She traveled with him on most campaign trips, and left a favorable
1

impression wherever she went.
which ended her campaigning.

In 1950 she suffered a severe stroke,
Her condition had not improved greatly

in 1951, and she seemed to go into depression whenever her husband
was away from home.

The Senator helped her in every way he could.

He finally decided that her condition had stabilized to a point at
which he could make the race in 1952.^7
Even with this major question resolved, there were still doubts.
He told a friend: "I do not look forward to this campaign, or the job
itself, with anything like the enthusiasm I once did."^-8
In the end he resolved his doubts.
prevailed.

His strong sense of duty

All negative aspects of the campaign were superceded by

his belief that he had something to offer the country, and it was vital
to the future of the nation that he should become a candidate.
On October 16, 1951 Taft called a press conference to announce
his candidacy.

He told the two hundred reporters who were assembled

l^isaacson, pp. 186-89; Glenn Thompson, Cincinnati Enquirer,
11 February, 1948, p. 5.
^Patterson, pp. 450-51, 500-01, 509.
l8Ibid., p. 505.
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that:
I have decided to accept the invitation of...leading Republicans
of Wisconsin to enter the Wisconsin primary as a Republican
candidate for President of the United States. I have also agreed
to the use of my name as the first choice of the delegates of
Ohio...I am convinced that a majority of Republicans... throughout
the nation really desire me to be the candidate for the Party.19
The Senator suggested that he would base his campaign on three
issues: the return to the principles of individual freedom, with the
abandonment of the trend toward increased government spending and power;
the return of integrity to Washington; and a reassessment of foreign
policy.

Taft believed that the Democrats had let graft and corruption

get out of hand in Washington.

He also felt that mistakes had been

made in dealings with the Soviet Union.
one of bitter partisanship.

20

Thus his campaign was to be

In the conclusion of his statement Taft

referred indirectly to the "me too" brand of campaigning which
Republican candidates had waged in three previous presidential
elections.

He said:

I am going to run because I believe I can conduct the only
kind of campaign which will elect a Republican to office...
We can extend to the entire nation the methods which we used
in Ohio; a forthright presentation of our cause...and a
determined organization of every enthusiastic supporter to
interest the voters who have stayed at home in such large
numbers, but who can be interested and persuaded to vote if
there is enough enthusiasm on the part of the Republican
supporters. I am convinced that a great majority of the
American people today believe fundamentally in those
21
principles which the Republican Party can present to them.

l^New York Times, 17 October, 1951, pp. 1, 26; "Taft’s
Presidential Strategy: to beat both Ike and Truman," Newsweek 38
(29 October, 1951): 21-2.

20

New York Times. 17 October, 1951, p. 26.

21Ibid.
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Reaction to the announcement surprised no one.

Taft supporters

in the Middle West, such as Senators Milton Young of North Dakota
and John Bricker of Ohio pledged their support.

Others, notably

Senators Harry Darbey of Kansas, and Leveret Saltonstall of
Massachusetts considered Taft to be a fine Republican, though they
noted that General Eisenhower still had not made his position clear.
Press reaction was also mixed.
urging the Senator to run since 1950.

The Chicago Tribune

22

had been

Colonel McCormick was pleased

by the announcement, and his paper would, as in the past, be a steadfast supporter of Taft.

23

Predictably, the Eastern press was less than enthusiastic about
Taft's announcement.

A New York Times editorial of October 17 expressed

the view that it was not appropriate to characterize Taft as "midVictorian," since "his record on...public housing and public education...
in which he had proposed a large increase in initiative...does not
warrant this easy classification."

24

The Times was less than favorably

impressed by the Senator's position on foreign policy, calling it
"enigmatic and at times inconsistent," and suggesting that it would
be necessary for Taft to convince Republican voters that he was not
leading what was left of the isolationist wing of the party.

25

Other influential organs of Eastern journalism saw Taft in a

22
New York Times, 17 October, 1951, p. 26.
23

Patterson, p. 505.

^ N e w York Times, 17 October, 1951, p. 30.
25_, -j
Ibid.
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similar light.

The Luce publication, Life, while praising the

virtues of a "superior man from a superior family," pointed out that
the Ohioan's foreign policy speeches needed careful examination
before they could be supported.

In the opinion of the Life

editorial, it was not time to jump on the Taft bandwagon, since
General Eisenhower had yet to be heard from.

26

The New York Herald Tribune added its criticism of Taft's
foreign policy by commenting that Taft would be reluctant and timid
in his dealings with other nations.

The New Republic elaborated on

the theme of the Herald Tribune by comparing the Senator's abandon
ment of isolationism with a harpooned whale: "he has been dragged,
resisting, to the side of the U.S. ship as it sails toward one world
Criticism of the powerful journalists of the East coast was not
new to Taft.

In 1940, and again in 1948 they had taken a similar

position, and Taft did not count on their support in 1952.

Instead,

he hoped to overcome their strength by rallying a vast majority of
Republicans elsewhere in the nation.

To do this, he had to change a

key tactic of previous campaigns, in which he had, for the most part
avoided preference primaries.

Already committed to the Ohio and

Wisconsin contests, he decided that he would enter others if it
seemed wise.

His strategy would depend on Eisenhower's plans.

To help with the campaign, Taft appointed a committee composed

^ " T h e Campaign Begins," Life 31 (22 October, 1951): 38.
27

"Truman, Eisenhower, or Taft," New Republic 125 (29 November,
1951): 6.
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of party professionals.

The members, B. Carroll Reece of Tennessee,

Thomas C. Coleman of Wisconsin, and John D. M. Hamilton, along with
the Senator's friends, Tate and Ingalls were veterans of previous
campaigns.

They were long on experience but short on new ideas; like

Taft, they were Old Guard Republicans.

28

By the end of 1951, two other candidates were in the race.

Both

Harold Stassen of Minnesota and Earl Warren of California wanted the
nomination, but in the opinion of most political observers, they
had little chance of success.

Despite this negative view, both

candidates remained in the race with the hope of having an impact on
the outcome of the convention.

29

Though three Republicans had declared their candidacy, most
liberals and moderates in the Party waited for a fourth man to decide
if he was interested in the nomination.

The end of the year came, and

the question of the future of General Eisenhower had not been answered.
Earlier in the year Truman had appointed Eisenhower to the N. A. T. 0.
command in Western Europe.
his new duties.

The general had gone to France to take up

Though an ocean

separated the General from events

in the United States, more than seventy-five Republican officials came
to France to try to persuade him to seek the nomination.

Most

persuasive was Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, who stressed
that Eisenhower was the one potential candidate who could be elected.
Lodge believed that the General could bring about a partial reversal

^Isaacson, p. 305; Custer, p. 23-4.
29
David, Moos, and Goldman, 1: 28-9; "Stassen Tries Again,"
Newsweek 38 (1 January, 1952): 13-15; Harold L. Ickes, "Harold E. is
for Stassen," New Republic 126 (14 January, 1952): 18.
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of the trend toward big government, while avoiding the mistakes of
isolationism.

After listening to the Senator, Eisenhower agreed to

"think the matter over."30
While Eisenhower thought, pressure for his candidacy continued
to build.

In late September, 1951, Governor Sherman Adams of New

Hampshire told the National Governors conference in Gatlinburg,
Tennessee, that Eisenhower's name would be on the primary ballot of
his state, and that, unlike 1948, it would not be withdrawn.
Two factors made the announcement important.

First, New Hampshire

held the first primary in the nation; the winner there would gain
valuable momentum for the rest of rhe race.

The second factor was a

New Hampshire law which required that a candidate for president be of
the same political party as the people who signed his nominating
petitions.32

Thus, Eisenhower had to make two decisions.

He had to

decide his attitude toward running, and he had to declare his political
affiliation.
As late as January 1, 1952, Eisenhower still had not decided on
his course of action.

He wrote to President Truman on that date to

tell the President that his often expressed conviction against
running for office still held.

He wrote: "I do not feel that I have

any duty to seek a political nomination, in spite of the fact that

^^Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, (New York: Doubleday,
1964), p. 18-9; Lurie, p. 31.
3^David, Moos, and Goldman, 1: 28.
32Ibid., p. 29-31;
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many have urged to the contrary.

Because of this belief I shall not

do so."33
Eisenhower may not have felt a duty to run, but his supporters
were as insistent as ever.

On January 6, Senator Lodge made an

announcement to the press which answered the question of the General's
party affiliation once and for all.

The Senator said: "General

Eisenhower has assured me that he is a Republican...1 am speaking
for the General and I will not be repudiated." 34

The next day, the

General announced from France that Lodge's statement correctly
summarized his views.

He added that while he would not participate in

campaign activities, he did not question the right of his supporters
to work for his nomination if they chose.

He would do nothing to

help them, but he would not act to hinder their efforts.

The General's

supporters secured enough signatures on petitions to enter his name in
the New Hampshire primary, and since no request for withdrawal came
from abroad, Eisenhower was in the race to

s ta y .

While the Eisenhower candidacy was evolving, Robert Taft was
changing his opinion of the General.

Late in 1950 he told a friend,

"I don't believe he (Eisenhower) has any basic knowledge of government.
Consequently, he is likely to accept the advice of those who are
intimate with him at the moment."36

As it became clear that the General

33Eisenhower, p. 22.
3^David, Moos, and Goldman, 1: 29; Eisenhower, p. 20.
35Eisenhower, p. 21; Lurie, p. 33; David, Moos, and Goldman, 1:
30; 2: 32-3.
36
Patterson, pp. 514-15.
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was going to be a formidable candidate, the Senator began to try
to minimize the differences between himself and the General.

Taft

hoped that he would not run.
By January, 1952, Taft knew that his hope was forlorn, Eisenhower
was in the New Hampshire primary to stay.
entering the contest in New Hampshire.
campaign committee.

Taft was uncertain about

He sought advice from his

John D. M. Hamilton, who had been given the assign

ment of coordinating campaign activities in the East, conducted a
poll of New Hampshire voters which indicated that the Senator could
win.

Still Taft was hesitant.

of time and money.

The campaign would take a great deal

The Adams organization would be against him.

he had to prove his vote getting ability against Eisenhower.

Yet

Finally,

convinced by the Hamilton poll, and encouraged by the endorsement of an
anti-Adams faction headed by Wesley Powell, Taft decided to enter the
primary.37
Because of his duties in the Senate, and prior speaking engage
ments, Taft was not able to go to New Hampshire until March 6— the
primary took place on March 11. There was little time to influence
a contest the outcome of which was, in the minds of most experts,
u n c e r t a i n . W h e n he finally did arrive he showed the voters three
days of strenuous campaigning.

From Berlin in the north to Nashua

in the south; from the coast near Portsmouth to the Connecticut

37uavid, Moos, and Goldman, 2: 33; Patterson, pp. 523-5.
^^Harold Lavin, "New Hampshire Debating Society," Newsweek 39
(25 February, 1952): 25-7; New York Times, 23 February, 1952, p. 6.
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river valley, Taft emphasized the corruption of the Truman administra
tion, mistakes in foreign policy, and the inexperience of General
Eisenhower.^
Taft also made an issue of the people not knowing where Eisenhower
stood on the problems of the day.

In a speech at Manchester, he said:

Governor Adams and Senators Lodge and Duff have done the
General a tremendous disservice by bringing him into a contest
when it is impossible for him to take a position on any contro
versial issue, or let the people know how he stands. They have
undertaken to publish...general statements from which they draw
conclusions that cannot possibly be justified. The truth is
that my principle opponent has taken no definite position on
any issue.40
The Eisenhower forces were at a disadvantage in New Hampshire.
General was still in Europe.

The

They tried to make up for his absence by

having at least two governors and four senators campaign for him.

They

stressed Taft’s slowness to realize the danger of the Second World War,
and lack of strong support for the North Atlantic Treaty.

One of

their spokesmen, Paul Hoffman— former head of the Economic Cooperation
Administration, stressed a point which was to play a major role through
out the campaign.

He suggested that Eisenhower was the only candidate

who could bring independent and Democratic voters into the Republican
Party, the voters necessary for victory.
Taft quarreled with Hoffman's premise that independents could be

3% e w York Times, 7 March, 1952, pp. 14-5; 8 March, 1952, p. 8;
9 March, 1952, p. 49.
40john S. Fenton, New York Times, 8 March, 1952, p. 8.
41Ibid.
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brought into the Republican Party by a scaled-down version of the
New Seal.

He believed that independent voters were waiting for a

campaign based on clear-cut alternatives.

The thirty-five million

voters who previously had stayed at home now would vote—

and,

reasoned Taft, they would vote Republican.4^
When the votes were counted on March 11, Eisenhower won with
a plurality of 11,000 votes.43
by the result in New Hampshire.

Taft was only slightly disappointed
He felt that he had not spent enough

time in the state, thus his campaign had not reached many of the
small hamlets and villages.

He was pleased by the fact that he had

carried Manchester, the state’s largest city.

Taft felt certain

that the upcoming primaries in Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Illinois would
bring better results.44
While Taft was slightly disappointed by the results of the
primary, Eisenhower and his supporters were quite pleased.

"I was

deeply moved," said Eisenhower, "any American would be, if other
Americans felt that way about him."45
On balance, the New Hampshire primary proved that Eisenhower
had considerable vote-getting ability.

As a New York Times editorial

4^James Reston, New York Times, 7 March, 1952, p. 15.
43i)avid, Moos, and Goldman, 2: 37; New York Times, 12 March, 1952,
p. 1. The final vote totals were: Eisenhower, 46,661; Taft, 35,838.
Harold Stassen, who was also on the ballot, received 6,574..
44Ibid., 13 March, 1952, p. 20.
45New York Times, 13 March, 1952, p. 1.
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pointed out, the General had won the first test of strength among
the major candidates.

Had his concept of duty allowed him to campaign

in person, his margin of victory might have been greater.

Still,

Taft could far better afford to lose this one primary than Eisenhower.
New Hampshire was not a decisive defeat for Taft.^
Supporters of the General were even more encouraged the following
week, when he came within 20,000 votes of defeating Stassen in the
Minnesota primary.

What made this remarkable was the fact that Stassen’s

name appeared on the ballot while Eisenhower’s did not, and little
organization had gone into the write-in campaign.47

Political

observers called it the Minnesota miracle, and saw Eisenhower's showing
as further evidence of great voter appeal.

In short, the General's

showing was much more impressive than it had been in New Hampshire.
Arthur Krock of the New York Times suggested that Taft had
suffered a "double blow” as a result of the Minnesota primary.

Krock

believed that the momentum had shifted dramatically from the Senator
to the General, and he also pointed out that the combined vote for
Eisenhower and Stassen meant dissatisfaction with Taft’s position on
foreign policy.48
Krock also had a warning for Eisenhower.

He wrote that because

the rules of the delegate selection process were made by politicians
for politicians: "the General must come back (from Europe) some weeks

46flew York Times, 12 March, 1952, p. 26; 13 March, 1952, p. 28.
^David, Moos, and Goldman, 4: 170-73; New York Times, 20 March,
1952, p. 1.
^Arthur Krock, New York Times, 20 March, 1952, p. 28.
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before the Republican convention meets to assure that his open and
latent strength will be registered" on the politicians who controlled
the Party.49
Taft did not enter the Minnesota primary because Stassen, a
native of the state, was on the ballot.

The Senator spent most of

his time campaigning throughout Wisconsin.
April 1 took on greater importance.

The primary there on

Taft had to win to blunt the

Eisenhower momentum.
Opposing Taft in Wisconsin were Warren and Stassen— Eisenhower
did not have his name on the ballot.

Warren was making his only

campaign outside of the Pacific Coast, and Stassen, after his poor
showing in Minnesota was merely going through the motions.^0

At one

point he tried to help his candidacy by offering to divide any delegates
he won in the state between himself and Eisenhower.

The ploy failed.-^

The issues were similar to those in New Hampshire.

Taft continued

to stress the need for sweeping change in Washington, and the need for
a Republican to carry on a campaign of issues rather than personalities.
The Senator’s opponents continued to stress Taft's record on foreign
CO

policy, and the fact that they believed he would not be electable.J

^Arthur Krock, New York Times, 20 March, 1952, p. 28.
50New York Times, 24 March, 1952, p. 16; David, Moos, and Goldman ,
4: 134-36.
5^Ibid.; New York Times, 25 March, 1952, p. 22.
^Ibid., 24 March, 1952, p. 1; 25 March, 1952, p. 21; 27 March,
1952, p. 23.
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When the votes were counted on April 1, Taft received some
forty per cent of the vote to Warren’s thirty-three per cent.
Stassen was far behind.53

fhe same day the Senator won a primary in

Nebraska by receiving 12,000 more votes than Eisenhower.

Neither

candidate’s name appeared on the ballot; voters had to write in their
choice.54

Political observers were not surprised by Taft's showing in the
Middle West.

In an editorial of April 3, the New York Herald Tribune

took the position that:
The Taft candidacy emerges, after the vote, in the form it
has held almost from the start; a powerful movement, the
expression of a hard campaigner, backed by considerable
organization strength, but lacking the momentum of great
popular d r i v e . 55
The editorial pointed out that when added together the vote for Warren
and Stassen in Wisconsin, and the vote for Eisenhower and Stassen in
Nebraska, far outnumbered the votes cast for Taft in both states.
This had taken place despite the support of the organization in both
states.

The view of the Herald Tribune was echoed by the Dallas Times

Herald which suggested that Taft had kept himself in the race even
though his victories were not overwhelming.

The editorial continued:

53David, Moos, and Goldman, 4: 138; New York Herald Tribune, 2
April, 1952, p. 1. Taft won twenty-four of the thirty Wisconsin
delegates. Warren won the other six.
54jjew York Herald Tribune, 3 April, 1952, p. 4.
5 5 i b i d .

, p. 24.
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For Eisenhower supporters, the Wisconsin and Nebraska
results merely serve to remind them that they have
plenty of work ahead of them. The New Hampshire and
Minnesota voting caused some of them to think Eisen
hower’s nomination was a foregone conclusion. Now
that Taft has had a shot in the arm...the Eisenhower
forces are duly warned.56
The primaries of March and early April began a trend which
continued throughout the remaining contests.

Taft was successful

west of the Alleghenies, while Eisenhower did well along the eastern
seaboard.

Thus Taft won primaries in Illinois, Ohio, West Virginia,

and South Dakota, while Eisenhower was victorious in New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts.

Eisenhower also won the Oregon

primary, and Warren won in his home state of California.
While these contests were capturing most of the headlines,
other events of great importance were taking place.
Shortly after Taft won the Illinois primary on April 8,
Eisenhower announced that he was resigning the N. A. T. 0. command
to return to the United States about June 1 to let the people know
where he stood on the

i ss ues.

57

Pressure had been building on the

General to make such an announcement.

As early as March 17, C. L.

Salzberger of the New York Times reported from Paris that an
announcement of resignation was under

consideration.

58

On March 20

56pallas Times Herald, 3 April, 1952, p. 4B.
-^Walter Trohan, Chicago Tribune, 11 April, 1952, p. 1.
58C . L. Salzberger, New York Times, 17 March, 1952, pp. 1, 13.
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Eisenhower reacted to his showing in the Minnesota primary bv telling
a reporter in France:
The mounting number of mv fellow citizens who are voting
to make me the Republican nominee are forcing me ^
reexamine mv present position and past decisions.
Taft was happv with the news that Eisenhower was coming home.
He issued a statement on the matter on April 12 which said:
Millions of Americans must have shared my own pleasure in
hearing the news that General Eisenhower plans to come
home on June 1 and present his candidacy in person...I
extend a cordial invitation to him to campaign actively
as I have been doing so that we may both present to
Republicans our definite views on the issues before the
people, on the position the Republican Party should take
on these issugg, and on the kind of campaign that should
be conducted.
Taft encouraged Eisenhower to -speak out on the issues because he
hoped that the General thereby would alienate some of his support.
A public opinion poll showing such an effect was published in the
Chicago Tribune. ^

Since Taft’s position already was clear, he did

not face this liability.
Taft campaigned vigorously throughout the nation.

He not only

spent time in the primary states, but also in many others— owing to
the fact that two thirds of the delegates to the convention were
elected by other methods.

He continued to attack the Truman adminis-

59
David, Moos, and Goldman, 4: 174.
^^New York Herald Tribune, 13 April, 1952, p. 1.
^Chicago Tribune, 21 April, 1952, p. 5. The poll was attributed
to Professor Kenneth Colgrove of Northwestern University. No informa
tion as to the methodology of the survey was available.
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tration on labor and foreign policies, and to urge his colleagues
to conduct a campaign based on Party principles.

He now avoided

criticism of Eisenhower, though he wished that the General had decided
to come home earlier than June 1.
Polls showed the two candidates to be even.**3
most

ofthe delegates from the East, but Taft

well

in

the

Eisenhower swept

by lesser margins did

Middle West and Mountain states.Taft won two early

victories in the South by gaining unanimous support of the Kentucky
and Tennessee

delegations.

63

Political observers at first expected

him to sweep the rest of Dixie.

By the middle of April, these

observers were ready to admit that they were in error.

The south

might be a decisive battleground for Taft and Eisenhower.
In the states of the old Confederacy, the Republican Party was
a small exclusive club which never grew.

The Party was a political

force in name only, except when a Republican occupied the White House.
At that time the small organizations would dispense patronage.

Many

leaders in the South supported Taft from the beginning of his quest
for the nomination in 1940.

In most cases support of the southern

leaders meant delivery of the votes which they controlled.
Small as the party organizations were, they were not without
internal strife.

In Georgia and Mississippi, two separate groups of

Republicans had evolved from one source.

Traditionally the Republican

National Committee had to decide which group was the real Party in
the state.

Race was a factor.

Factions headed by G. Roscoe Tucker in

62chicago Tribune, 13 April, 1952, p. 6; 20 April, 1952, p. 3;
New York Times, 12 May, 1952, p. 12.
63Ibid.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113

Georgia and Perry Howard in Mississippi admitted blacks to membership.
The opposing groups were known as "lillie whites."

Invariably, the

National Committee seated the integrated groups.^
Only rarely, as in 1948, did these factional disputes take the
form of disputes between candidates.

Most of the time, they were

local affairs.65
The scope of conflict within the Republican Party in southern
states was to broaden in 1952.

Factions sided with candidates, and

struggle evolved over the best method to broaden the base of the Party,
if it could be done at all.

Three states, Georgia, Louisiana, and

Texas, would be the scene for this significant struggle.
Because of its size most attention focused on Texas.

The

Republican Party in Texas was dominated for decades by National
Committeeman R. B. Creager, Taft’s floor manager at the 1940 convention,
and a strong supporter of the Senator in 1948.

His death in 1950

prompted a struggle for control of the Party— a struggle which
included control of the delegation to the convention of 1952.

Henry

Zweifel of Fort Worth was elected to the National Committee over
H. J. (Jack) Porter of Houston.By March, 1951, Zweifel had decided
to support Taft, while Porter, noting

that there was considerable

sentiment for Eisenhower, decided to support the General.
Taft badly needed the thirty-eight votes of the Texas delegation.

6^New York Times. 21 June,

1940, p. 17; 23 June, 1940, p. 2.

^Ibid., 19 June, 1948, p.

1; 22 June, 1948, p. 1.
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He sent David Ingalls to Texas to assess the situation.
found strong sentiment for Eisenhower.

Ingalls

Taft’s representative there

fore tried to work for a compromise between the two factions. In
this he was not successful.

He told Jack Porter in 1951, "The thing

that astonishes me is the fact that with so few Republicans as you
have in Texas, you can’t get together.
Taft continued to rely on Zweifel while Eisenhower followers
pinned their hopes on Porter who organized a campaign to persuade
independents and Democrats to participate in the Republican primary.
Texas law was ambiguous on the activities of political parties.

One

clause stated that any qualified voter could participate in party
processes.

A voter could not vote in the primary of both parties

on the same day.

A clause which seemed tc contradict the first, said that

only the voters of a particular party could take part in the activities
of that party.^7
The election code provided for a three-tiered system of selecting
convention delegates.

Precinct meetings elected delegates to county

conventions, which in turn chose delegates to the state conventions.
The state conventions choose the delegates to the National convention.
It was with the hope of controlling the delegate selection that the
Porter faction began its campaign to bring independents and Democrats.

^Patterson, p. 539.
67David, Moos, and Goldman, 3: 317-18.
^®Paul T. David; Ralph M. Goldman; and Richard C. Bane, The
Politics of National Party Conventions, (Washington, D. C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1960), p. 554.
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into the Republican Party.
Zweifel and the State Committee were not idle.

In February

they published a pledge to be signed by participants in the precinct
meetings.

It said:

"I am a Republican and desire to participate in

Republican Party activities in the year 1952.

The pledge was

designed to discourage "One Day Republicans"— Democrats and independents
who simply wanted to go to the precinct meetings to vote for Eisen
hower and then return to their previous political affiliation.
The Eisenhower supporters reacted to the pledge by issuing a
statement which told Texas voters:
If asked to sign a declaration that you will support the
Republican nominee, sign it. The Supreme Court of Texas
held, in effect, that you can vote Republican one day,
Democratic the next, and vote in the general election the
next day...Do not be intimidated.70
Little was decided at either the precinct meetings on May 3, or
the county convention on May 6.

At both levels, Eisenhower supporters

took control in most of the large cities, and some rural areas.

Taft

forces walked out of many of the meetings to hold their own sessions.
Thus contesting sets of delegates were elected to the State convention
which would take place at Mineral Wells on May 27.71
Though the first two rounds of the delegate selection process
settled little, they served to point out the ground for argument within

69pavid, Moos,

and Goldman, 3: 319.

^Ibid., 3; pp. 319-20; Dallas Times Herald, 19 April, 1952, p. 2.
^Dallas Times Herald, 4 May, 1952, pp. 1, 20; 7 May, 3952, p. 1;
Mew York Times, 4 May, 1952, pp. 12, 13; New York Herald Tribune, 7 May,
1952, p. 7.
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the Texas G. 0. P.

Porter argued that Eisenhower was the popular

choice of the people of Texas.

They had come to precinct meetings in

larger numbers than ever before to express their support for the
General.

People like these would be needed to make Texas a two-party

state.
Zweifel and the Taft supporters believed that most of the
General's followers were infiltrators trying to take over the Republican
Party from the outside.

They were not really Party members, and

probably would not support Taft if he became the nominee.

Zweifel

believed that, because of this, the votes of these infiltrators should
not be counted.
The argument in Texas was heated in the three weeks between the
county conventions on May 6 and the State convention on May 27.

Both

sides began to converge on the West Texas town of Mineral Wells on the
weekend before the convention.

With them came leading strategists

for both Taft and Eisenhower, and influential members of the national
press.72
Before the state convention could meet, however, the matter of
contesting delegations had to be decided.
seats in the convention were contested.

Almost one-half of the
The job of resolving the

disputes was taken up by the State Executive Committee.

With Zweifel

in full control of the meeting, and despite evidence of large
majorities for Eisenhower in many of the county conventions, the State
committee resolved most of the disputes in favor of delegates who

72patterson, p. 540; Dallas Times Herald, 18 May, 1952, p. 1;
19 May, 1952, p. 1; 20 May, 1952, p. 1.
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supported Taft.

Zweifel said that the Republican Party had been

"saved from mob rule."7^
The next day the full state convention met.

An important

ruling allowed delegates on the temporary role to vote on all seating
contests, except when disputes involved their home county.

Since most

of the disputed delegate seats were awarded to Taft supporters, this
ruling allowed them to quickly approve the work of the state committee
and take full control of the convention.

They quickly used their

strength to elect a delegation to the convention in Chicago which,
reporters estimated, would cast thirty votes for Taft and four for
Eisenhower.74
As soon as the strength of the Taft supporters became apparent,
Porter and the Eisenhower delegates walked out of the convention.
They joined their friends who had not been seated by the State
Committee in a rump convention and quickly chose a slate of delegates
of their own.

An estimate showed that the Porter delegation would

vote thirty-three for Eisenhower and five for Taft.7^
Taft reacted to the situation in Texas with uncharacteristic
slowness.

On May 20 he wrote to Marrs McLean, one of his supporters

in the state, "I would like to make a compromise if we can, because
I don’t like the idea of contests and the bitterness which is brought
about by them.

° Taft, despite letters and telegrams from Texans

73pallas Times Herald, 27 May, 1952, p. 1; New York Times, 27 May
1952, p. 1; David, Moos, and Goldman, 3: 323.
7^New York Times, 28 May, 1952, p. 1; New York Herald Tribune,
28 May, 1952, p. 1; David, Moos, and Goldman, 3: 323-24.
75Ibid.
7^Patterson, pp. 542-43.
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which warned him of the tactics of Zweifel, did nothing to interfere
in Texas.

He believed that politicians within the state should solve

their own problems.^
Taft and his supporters were inept in Texas.

They were uncompromising

in the belief that only "real Republicans" should participate in the
delegate selection process.

To keep the party pure,ruthless methods

had been used to override the will of the majority of participants at
the precinct conventions.
On the other hand, the Eisenhower supporters used the Texas
controversy to great advantage.

In a statement made shortly after the

Mineral Wells convention, Herbert Brownell, one of Eisenhower's top
level strategists, said: "The Taft forces are now convinced that he
cannot win the nomination, so now they are out to steal it."7®

Victims

of a ruthless machine, they decided to take their case to the floor
of the convention.
Many elements of the press were outraged by the tactics used by
Zweifel and his followers.

Joseph Alsop who was in Mineral Wells

expressed a widely held opinion:
With the on the spot approval of Senator Taft's personal
representatives, the Texas delegation has been stolen for
the Ohio Senator. This steal has been accomplished by a
system of rigging as grossly dishonest, as nakedly undemocratic,
as arrogantly careless of majority rule, as can be found in
the long annals of American politics.79

77New York Times, 25 May, 1952, p. 42.
7®William H. Lawrence, New York Times, 29 May, 1952, pp. 1, 24.
79St. Louis Post Dispatch, 2 June, 1952, p. 1C.
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The views expressed by Alsop were typical of the media.

The New

York Times and the New York Herald Tribune were critical of the
"steam roller" tactics used by Taft’s managers in Texas.

80

Despite

every effort to justify the actions of his supporters, Taft was plagued
by the charge of stealing delegates until the issue was decided by
the Republican convention.
The Texas convention took place in a very eventful week.

The

primary season closed one week after the events at Mineral Wells, and
General Eisenhower returned home on June 1, just four days after the
Texas convention.
The General officially resigned from the army on June 2, and then
headed for Abilene, Kansas where he made his first speech of the
campaign on June 4.®^
at Abilene.

Supporters of the General applauded his efforts

They believed it to contain positive and specific state

ments of the General’s position on the issues of the day.^^

On the

other hand, opponents believed that the speech, and a news conference
which followed on June 5, were full of vague and general statements.
Taft’s campaign manager for the South, B. Carroll Reece, said:

80New York Times, 28 May, 1952, p. 22; 29 May, 1952, p. 26;
New York Herald Tribune, 28 May, 1952, p. 22; "How to Stop a Steam
roller," New Republic 126 (23 June, 1952): 2.
^^Washington Post, 3 June, 1952, p. 1; 4 June, 1952, p. 1; New
York Herald Tribune, 2 June, 1952, p. 1; 3 June, 1952, p. 1; 4 June,
1952, p . 1.
*^St. Louis Post Dispatch, 5 June, 1952, p. 2B; 6 June, 1952,
p. 2D; New York Herald Tribune, 5 June, 1952, pp. 1, 15, 17, 22.
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"it looks like he is pretty much for mother, home, and heaven."88
Taft remarked that the General had given "some implications as to a
position on various important issues, but not very definite commitments
on these implications."8^
The next day Taft was able to seize headlines away from Eisen
hower by urging a compromise on the Texas contests.

While in

Indianapolis to campaign for support from the Indiana organization,
he told a reporter:

"I hope we can compromise the contests where

there is any serious difference on legal grounds.

I would like to

avoid contests...if differences can be settled on a fair basis."

85

Taft disregarded the advice of supporters who believed that since
they controlled the machinery of the convention, Taft should not
compromise; he should let the strength of his supporters win the day
for him.86
Henry Cabot Lodge made the position of the Eisenhower faction
clear when he said:
It is never right to compromise with dishonesty. We are in
the right, both on the facts and on the law, and will enter
into no deal which will disfranchise the Republicans of
Texas. The convention itself will decide the issue, and I
have no doubt about its d e c i s i o n . 87
In the minds of Eisenhower*s supporters,

andlater

the General himself,

the disputes over delegates were not merely political or factional;

88 New York Herald Tribune, 5 June,

1952, p.17.

8^ Ibid., 6 June, 1952, p. 5.
88 Ibid., 7 June, 1952, p. 1.
86 Patterson, pp. 544-45.
8^ New York Herald Tribune, 7 June, 1952, p. 1.
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they involved moral issues.

Theft of delegates, and denial of the will

of the majority were involved.
On the other hand, Taft believed that only a political question was
involved.

There was no moral issue.

In their zeal to keep out "One

Day Republicans," his supporters had gone a bit too far.
to compromise on this basis.

Taft was willing

Eisenhower was not, and never would be.

The weeks between Eisenhower’s return and the convention were
busy for both candidates.

Both men tried to influence the few

delegates who remained uncommitted.

Eisenhower’s supporters used

public opinion polls which showed that their candidate would easily
defeat any Democratic candidate, while Taft would be defeated by whom
ever the Democrats chose.

The refrain, "Taft can’t win," echoed

throughout the country.®®

Taft countered by arguing that polls had

been wrong before.
the polls.

Dewey was supposed to win in 1948, according to

The Senator pointed out that his vigorous campaign would

bring undecided voters to the polls.

In short, this was relying on

the argument he had used in his declaration of candidacy.
Throughout June, polls showed that neither candidate had a
majority at the convention.

Taft led slightly in committed delegates,

but he still was more than one hundred votes short of the 604 votes
needed to nominate.
By July 1, Republicans began to gather in Chicago.

They were

®®Washington Post, 6 June, 1952, p. 25; 13 June, 1952, p. 21;
18 June, 1952, p. 13.
89»’Taft Extends his Lead," Life 32 (16 June, 1952): 28; "Taft has
edge in Delegates," Newsweek 39 (23 June, 1952): 29.
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there to see what action would be taken on the delegate seating
contests.

Because the race was so close, resolution of these disputes

would have a considerable impact on the outcome of the convention.
Before the convention officially opened the National Committee
had jurisdiction over contested delegations.

Most observers agreed

that Taft supporters were in control of the National Committee.
observers were quickly proved to be correct.

These

The first issue was

procedural: whether to allow television or radio coverage of
committee proceedings.

Taft stated that he had no objection to media

coverage of the proceedings, although he suggested that the final
decision on the matter be left to the Committee.
His supporters ignored the advice of their leader.

They used

their control of the committee to pass a resolution which barred the
electronic media from the proceedings.
Taft’s supporters again had blundered.

Dewey, Lodge, and other

Eisenhower leaders leveled charges that the barring of radio and
television coverage was another indication that the Taft steamroller
was in high gear.

The belief

as expressed by Taft’s spokesman on

the committee, that cameras and microphones would make a travesty of
the proceedings was not sufficient justification for barring the media.
The press had still another issue on which to attack Taft.^

^^New York Herald

Tribune, 2 July, 1952, p. 5.

^ S t . Louis Post Dispatch,
92flew York Herald
Decisions at Chicago,"

1 July, 1952, pp. 1-2.

Tribune, 2 July, 1952, pp. 1-3, 18; "Crucial
Newsweek 40 (14 July, 1952): 21-25.
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For the next two days Taft supporters on the National Committee
continued to show their strength.

In delegate contests from Georgia,

QO
Louisiana, and Mississippi, supporters of the Senator were seated.7-1
While the National Committee was meeting in Chicago, twenty-three
of the twenty-five Republican governors met at the National Governors
conference in Houston, Texas.

Most of the Governors were supporters of

Eisenhower, though a few were neutral, and three supported Taft.

On

July 2 they took note of the events which were taking place in Chicago.
Their spokesman, Dan Thornton of Colorado, released the text of a
telegram which had been sent to Republican National Chairman Guy
George Gabrielson— a telegram which was signed by all Republican
Governors who were in Houston.

94

The statement urged that the tradition

of integrity and fairness within the Republican Party be upheld.

To

ensure fairness the Governors wanted the National Committee to adopt
a rule which would forbid any delegate whose seat was being contested,
from voting until the contest was settled.

Adoption of the proposal

would be a defeat for Taft, who was counting on the support of the
disputed delegates who had been seated temporarily by the National

93st. Louis Post Dispatch, 1 July, 1952, p. 1; 2 July, 1952,
p. 1; New York Herald Tribune, 2 July, 1952, pp. 1, 3; 3 July, 1952,
p. 1.
^ T h r e e governors who supported Taft later repudiated the
document. Two governors who were not present, Fine of Pennsylvania
and McKeldin of Maryland, both endorsed the statement, though they
were both uncommitted at the time. See New York Herald Tribune. 4
July, 1952, p. 1.
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Committee.

The disputed delegates still held the balance of power

QC
at the convention. J
On July 4 the National Committee began discussion of the Texas
dispute.

At its outset, Gabrielson, who chaired the meeting, read

two telegrams.

The first was from Herbert Hoover.

The former

President hoped to avoid a split within the Party, and therefore
proposed that representatives of both candidates meet with him, and
together they might work out an agreement.
from Taft.

96

The second telegram was

It too sought compromise, though it went further than

Hoover’s proposal.

Taft had studied the situation in Texas.

He

believed that sufficient evidence existed for him to claim nineteen
of the thirty-two district delegates from the state.
Eisenhower to be entitled to the other thirteen.

He believed

As a gesture of

good will, the Senator suggested that the six delegates at large be
divided equally between the two candidates.

97

Eisenhower and his campaign strategists rejected both proposals.
They were opposed to any deals involving stolen delegates.

They had

been defeated by the National Committee and they were likely to lose
■in the credentials committee.

But they were confident of the support

of a majority of convention delegates.

The delegates would not stand

for steam roller tactics.

^~*New York Herald Tribune, 3 July, 1952, pp. 1, 3.
96

Ibid., 5 July, 1952, pp. 1-2.

97

Ibid. The test of Taft’s analysis of the Texas situation is
contained in Official Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth
Republican National Convention, (Washington, D. C.: Judd & Detweiler,
1952), pp. 208-09, (hereafter referred to as Proceedings). See also:
David, Moos, and Goldman, 3: 329-30.
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Despite the refusal of Eisenhower to agree to the Taft proposal,
it was adopted by a vote of sixty to forty-one in the National Committee.
The Taft majority had prevailed again.^
The National Committee finished its work on disputed delegates on
July 4, three days before the opening of the convention.

Though Taft

had won in every contest, both candidates were confident of victory.
The Associated Press poll suggested that Taft still had more committed
delegates than Eisenhower, though neither candidate had the 604 votes
needed for the nomination.
candidates.

About 125 delegates supported other

The poll revealed that the key to the convention lay in

the disputed delegations of Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas, and the
largely uncommitted Pennsylvania and Michigan delegations.

99

Pressure

from both Taft and Eisenhower supporters had been brought to bear on
the leaders of these large delegations.

But Governor John S. Fine of

Pennsylvania, and National Committeeman Arthur Summerfield of Michigan
refused to say how their delegations would vote.

They were waiting for

the right moment to make their choice known.
The opening session of a national convention is usually routine.
Temporary rules of procedure are adopted.

Usually these are the rules

of the previous convention which serve until permanent rules are
approved.

98
David, Moos, and Goldman, 3: 338-39.
99

St. Louis Post Dispatch, 7 July, 1952, p. 2.

^ ^New York Herald Tribune, 6 July, 1952, pp. 1, 3, 10.
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Routine was abandoned in 1952 however.

In meetings during

the weekend, supporters of Eisenhower agreed on a strategy based on
the declaration of the Republican governors.

The decided to offer

an amendment to the motion for adoption of the temporary rules.

The

amendment would provide that the rules of the 1948 convention would
be the temporary rules in 1952, except that no delegate would be
seated unless two thirds of the National Committee agreed that the
seat was not being contested.

Contested delegates could not take their

seats until the credentials committee ruled on the disputes.

Until

that time, contested delegates would not be allowed to vote.

The

seats of sixty-eight delegates were being contested— thirty-eight
from Texas, seventeen from Georgia, and thirteen of the fifteen from

T . .
101
Louisiana.
Taft's strategists were aware of the Eisenhower tactics.
tried to avert a showdown vote by again offering to compromise.
previous efforts, Eisenhower's backers refused.

They
As with

102

As the convention opened, Taft strategists still argued over a
method of opposing the Eisenhower plan.

They knew that a vote on such

a broad issue as the exclusion of sixty-eight delegates from voting until
contests over their seats had been decided, was risky.

Finally, they

decided that Clarence Brown of Ohio should raise a point of order regarding
the fair play resolution to exclude seven Louisiana delegates from the
sixty-eight contested delegates.

These seven were district delegates,

^ ^New York Herald Tribune, 7 July, 1952, p. 2.

102

St. Louis Post Dispatch, 7 July, 1952, p. 1.
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and therefore under the rules of the Republican Party; only the state
committee of Louisiana had jurisdiction over them.

Brown reasoned

that chairman Gabrielson would agree to the point of order, and that
the delegates would not override the ruling of the chairman.

If

this happened a Taft supporter would move the adoption of the Eisen
hower proposal, and thus avert a showdown vote.

This tactic might

counter the Eisenhower charge that Taft was running a steamroller at
the convention.

103

Soon after the convention opened on July 7 both sides began to
manuever.

Senator Bricker of Ohio made the routine motion to adopt

the rules of the previous convention as temporary rules in 1952.
Governor Arthur B. Langlie of Washington then proposed the Eisenhower
’’fair play," substitute motion.
next move.

Taft supporters were surprised by the

Instead of rising to a point of order on the Langlie motion,

Clarence Brown proposed an amendment to that motion.

His amendment

struck the names of the seven Louisiana delegates from the names of those
delegates whose seats were being contested.

The trouble was that Brown

was forcing a vote— a move which other Taft supporters had tried to
avoid so early in the proceedings.^^
The convention floor contained a confused group of delegates who
had difficulty keeping up with the parliamentary maneuvers.

In addition,

Taft floor leaders had no effective communication among themselves and

103
Patterson, pp. 550-52.
^^Proceedings, pp. 26-9.
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with the delegates.

Two hours of debate were allowed for the question

of changing the rules.

The time was divided equally between Taft and

Eisenhower supporters.

Spokesmen for the General used their time to

argue that the Republican Party could not ignore the moral issues
involved in the theft of delegates if it wished to go into the
campaign with clean hands.

Governor Langlie pointed out that integrity

was necessary in order to fight corruption.

Taft supporters argued,

on the other hand, that it was unfair to change the rules in the middle
of the game, that denying the vote to contested delegates would lead
to specious contests at future conventions to manipulate the outcome of
those conventions.

105

Following the debate came the vote on the Brown amendment.
was defeated by a vote of 658 to 548.

It

At that point a Taft supporter

moved the adoption of the temporary rules as amended by the Langlie
.
„ 106
substitute.
The defeat was costly, though not necessarily fatal for Taft.
He had received only 548 votes— fifty-six short of the number needed
to nominate a candidate.

He believed he could receive additional

support on the nominating ballot.

Opponents of the Brown amendment,

mustered fifty-four votes more than a majority of the convention, but
not all of these delegates could be counted on by the General on the
first ballot.

Taft was concerned with the votes of the favorite son

^ ^Proceedings, pp. 31, ff; Washington Post, 8 July, 1952, p. 1-2.
^^Proceedings, p. 48.
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and uncommitted delegations.

The combined vote of California,

pledged to Warren and Minnesota pledged to Stassen, was ninety-five
to one against the Brown amendment.

In the largest uncommitted states,

Michigan and Pennsylvania, the vote was 102 to fourteen against the
Brown amendment.

Taft hoped to gain votes from these delegations on

the merits of the individual contests.

He had to win these contests

because the sixty-eight votes were crucial to his chances for
nomination.

He also hoped that Warren and Stassen would still have

the support of their delegations, thus denying Eisenhower the nomination
of the first ballot.

Taft felt he still had a chance.

For the next two days— from Monday evening through Wednesday after
noon— the convention did little.

Many speeches were heard, including

the keynote address by Douglas MacArthur, and a speech by Herbert Hoover.
Both men were inclined to support Taft, but their speeches did little
to help his candidacy.
While the convention was marking time, the credentials committee,
which had jurisdiction over the delegate disputes, began to meet.
Unlike the national committee of the week before, television and radio
newsmen were allowed into the meeting room.

109

Most of the discussion

of July 8 involved a contest between two factions in Georgia.

When a

^ ^Proceedings, p. 48.
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Patterson, p. 556; St. Louis Post Dispatch, 8 July, 1952, p. 1;
Murray Snyder, New York Herald Tribune, 9 July, 1952, p. 1.
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vote was finally taken the "Foster” faction— favorable to Taft— was
seated.

Senator Lodge immediately told the press that the Georgia

contest would go to the convention floor for the decision of the
delegates.
The credentials committee then took up the Louisiana contest.
The Taft forces realized that their case was weak in Louisiana.

There

fore on July 9 T. Eugene Worrell of Virginia proposed that the Louisiana
delegation headed by John Minor Wisdom— the delegation which supported
Eisenhower— be seated.

Clarence Brown seconded the motion, and it was

passed without opposition.^''*'
Taft’s strategists hoped that concession on the Louisiana
delegation to Eisenhower would put pressure on the backers of the
General to make a similar compromise in Texas.
forthcoming, however.

No such action was

Lodge told the press that disputes over Georgia,

and if necessary Texas, would be taken to the floor of the convention,
because they were: "stains on the integrity of our party that we must
erase if we are to go to the people with clean hands and ask them to
•

112

have faith in our party to lead the nation in the years ahead.'1

The committee spent most of Wednesday, July 9, in debate over
Texas.

Late in the afternoon it seated the compromise delegation which

Taft had suggested to the National Committee.

113

The work of the

■*"^Burt Andrews, New York Herald Tribune, 9 July, 1952, p. 1;
Robert C. Albright, Washington Post, 9 July, 1952, p. 1.
^ ^New York Herald Tribune, 10 July, 1952, p. 8.
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credentials committee was complete.
While the credentials committee met, Taft continued his meetings
with convention delegates.

His confidence did not falter, despite

concession of eleven votes to Eisenhower in Louisiana.

Both the

Associated Press and the United Press polls of delegates showed that
he had a comfortable lead on the first ballot.

114

The Senator was

pleased with the actions taken by the credentials committee, and he
urged Eisenhower’s supporters not to appeal to the convention floor.
Taft pointed out that the committee was acting as a judicial body, while
the convention would vote along political l i n e s . T h i s argument was
specious, since the members of the credentials committee seemed to be
voting along lines which reflected their preference.

116

The evening session of the convention on Wednesday, July 9,
received the report of the credentials committee.

Since delegate

contests were handled in alphabetical order the less publicized Georgia
contest was debated before the important contest in Texas.
Georgia had sent contesting delegations to Republican Conventions
since 1944.

In that year, and in 1948, a delegation headed by G. Roscoe

Tucker was seated after a contest with a delegation headed by Roy G.
Foster.

In 1952, Tucker’s faction supported Eisenhower, while the Foster

~*~~*~^New York Herald Tribune, 9 July, 1952, p. 3; 10 July, 1952,
p. 6.
^ "^Washington Post, 10 July, 1952, p. 1; George H. Hall, St. Louis
Post Dispatch, 9 July, 1952, p. 2.
116
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Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

132
delegation was for Taft.

Foster based his attempt to overturn

precedent on a ruling from the Secretary of State of Georgia which
stated that Foster headed the legitimate Republican organization in
the state.

This decision was upheld by Judge Chester Byars of the

Georgia Superior Court on July 2, though the judge did not prejudice
the right of the Republican convention to decide the matter for itself.^
Forty-five minutes were given to each side in the debate.

Since

Eisenhower supporters were in the minority on the credentials committee
they presented the minority report first.

They used most of their time

to cite the 1944 and 1948 precedents for seating the Tucker delegation.
They also pointed out that a Georgia court did not have jurisdiction
over The Republican National convention.

Proponents of the minority

report used thirty minutes and then reserved the balance until the
majority position had been presented.

118

Only two spokesmen were used by proponents of the majority report.
First, Vernon Thompson of Wisconsin suggested that a court decision
should not be ignored.

Ee also chided speakers for the minority for

adherence to precedent, when only two days earlier they had struck
down a precedent of forty years standing by voting for the "fair play"
amendment.

Thompson was followed by Senator Everett M. Dirksen of

Illinois.

Realist enough to know that his words would have little

effect, Dirksen compared his efforts with a fight against the inevitable

117

Proceedings, pp. 165-66.

118Ibid., pp. 159-68.
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rolling of the tide.

Despite this, he invoked the words of St. Paul

by saying, "come let us reason together."

119

He observed that the

delegates themselves knew little of the conflict in Georgia, and both
the National Committee and the credentials committee had voted for
the Foster delegation.

And then Dirksen tried another approach:

When my friend Tom Dewey was the candidate in 1948, and in
1944, I tried to be one of his best campaigners. And you
ask him whether or not I didn't go into eighteen states one
year, and twenty-three states the next. Reexamine your
hearts before you take this action in support of the
minority report, because we followed you before, and you
took us down the path of
^-20
d e f e a t .

At this point pandemonium broke out on the convention floor.
supporters booed, while Taft supporters cheered.

Eisenhower

Fists flew, and in

the

Michigan delegation a delegate fainted and had to

the

floor.

be carriedfrom

Dirksen calmly surveyed the situation and said, "this is

no place for Republicans to be booing other Republicans...Fellow

-121

delegates I assure you I did not mean to precipitate a controversy.'1
Dirksen, better than anyone else, pointed out the main conflict
within the Republican Party in 1952.

The Dewey and Taft wings of the

party were still in basic disagreement over the role of the G. 0. P.
in national affairs.

They had agreed on a platform for the campaign in

November, but the bitterness of past defeats still lay heavily on many
supporters of Taft.
After Dirksen finished his speech, spokesmen for the minority report

^^Proceedings, p. 175.
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quickly summed up their case.

When they had finished, the convention

proceeded to vote on the matter.
by a vote of 607 to 531.

122

The minority report was approved

The uncommitted delegations and the delegations

which supported favorite sons made the difference.

California voted

sixty-two to eight for the minority report, while Minnesota cast all
twenty-eight votes for the "Tucker" delegation.

In Pennsylvania and

Michigan the minority received more than two thirds of the vote.

123

Realizing that a vote on the Texas contest, the next issue to come
before the convention, would be futile, the Taft forces moved to adopt
the minority report.

The issue which had given Eisenhower's supporters

grounds for attacking Taft, was resolved quietly in favor of the
General's supporters.

124

By July 10, most observers were agreed as to the final outcome
of the nomination struggle.

The vote on the Georgia contest showed

that Taft did not have the votes.

Fine of Pennsylvania and Summerfield

of Michigan had decided to cast their ballots for Eisenhower.

Stassen

and Warren were holding their delegations in line with great difficulty.
Taft had lost more than forty votes in the South by losing the seating
contests.

Those delegates could not be replaced.

the Senator could do.

There was little that

125
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124Ibid., pp. 214-15.
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p. 3; Edward T. Folliard, Washington Post, 10 July, 1952, p. 1; 11 July,
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He seemed to remain confident, however;
Stassen, though nothing was accomplished.

he met with Warren and

Later he urged General

MacArthur to take the vice-presidential nomination.

The General did

not respond.
On Thursday evening the convention met to hear the nominating
speeches.

Taft's name was placed in nomination by Dirksen.

The speech

was a warm tribute to Taft, and the demonstration which followed
continued for over half an hour.

These efforts changed no minds.

126

Because the session ran well into Friday July 11, balloting was
postponed until early afternoon of that day.
Taft and many of his supporters watched the session on television.
The Senator was still outwardly confident.

He called the convention

floor because he wanted to talk with Warren's manager, Senator William
F. Knowland of California, at the end of the first ballot.

He was told

by an aide that Knowland believed there would be no second ballot.
Knowland proved to be correct.

127

When the roll call ended, Eisenhower was only nine votes short
of victory.

These needed votes were quickly provided when Senator Thye

of Minnesota shifted his state's votes from Stassen to Eisenhower.
Taft was again denied the nomination of his party!

128

126

Edward Leahy, St. Louis Post Dispatch, 12 July, 1952, p. 2.
The other nominees were Eisenhower, Warren, Stassen, and MacArthur.
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Patterson, p. 558.
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Later that afternoon Eisenhower came to Taft's headquarters to
begin the process of unifying the party.

The meeting was emotional.

Taft did not begin to campaign actively for the General until late in
September.

Loyal supporters of the Senator knew, that unlike 1948,

Taft had made his last attempt to win the presidential nomination.
Eisenhower won the election in November, and Robert Taft died of
cancer in July, 1953.

Had he been nominated, and elected, he would

not have lived out his term.
What went wrong in 1952?
nomination.

Taft campaigned vigorously for the

But the foes of the past were still very much against him.

The Eastern press, still believed him to be an isolationist.

Such

liberals as Dewey still believed that the Republican Party had to keep
much of the New Deal programs which the Democrats had made law.

Taft,

despite strong support from conservatives, could not overcome these
powerful elements within his own party.

In addition, he could not

overcome the magnetism of General Eisenhower.

The Senator was hurt

by the ruthless tactics of his supporters in the South.

The southern

G. 0. P. was ready to break out of the club-like structure from which
William Howard Taft had benefited forty years before.
of a two party system in the South was at hand.

The beginning

The old leadership in

Texas, Louisiana and other states would be swept away by thousands of
new voters who wanted to be Republicans.

In time these new voters would

choose delegates who would nominate a conservative Republican for
President.

But it was not to be Robert Taft.

He had come on the scene

too late for the Republicanism of the twenties, and he died before

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137
conservatives regained control of the Party in the sixties.

He had

run in a time when easterners and liberals were the dominant force in
the Party.

Though strong in middle America, he was not strong enough

to overcome the dominant force of his generation.
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VI.
ASSESSMENT OF THE QUEST
Robert A Taft made three fullscale attempts to win the
presidential nomination of the Republican Party.
ful.

He was never success

Yet he was one of the most powerful men on another level of

American politics— the United States Senate.

Why was he unable to use

this powerful position to advantage in attaining his ultimate goal?
When Taft was elected to the Senate in 1938, he immediately
attracted the attention of many leading Republicans.

He was the son

of William Howard Taft, and his views were those of middle America.

He

was mildly isolationist, and opposed to most of Roosevelt’s domestic
programs.

He also had the advantage of coming into power at a time when

relatively few Republicans held high political office.

These factors,

together with Taft's sense of duty and purpose, provided the necessary
impetus for his first attempt to gain the presidential nomination in
1940.
The impetus was not enough.

By 1940 storm clouds of war were

gathering, which pushed many Republicans out of the ranks of the isola
tionists.

Taft did not follow.

He clung to his position of attacking

Roosevelt on both domestic and foreign policies.

Many old guard

Republicans supported his bid for the nomination, but the pressure from
the press of the Eastern seaboard was great.

The internationalists

and moderates decided to support Wendel Willkie.
Willkie blitz was unique within American politics.

The suddenness of the
Willkie won the

138
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nomination on the sixth ballot, despite the efforts of Taft's supporters.
The Senator showed considerable strength in 1940.

He received

support from delegates who switched from favorite son candidates as
they withdrew from the race.

Had Governor Bricker of Ohio been able

to press his motion for a recess of the convention after the fifth
ballot, the result might have been different.

Taft's supporters would

have had more time to work on the delegations from Pennsylvania and
Michigan, with the result that Senator Vandenberg and Governor James
may have been persuaded to change their minds.
ballot was allowed to proceed, and Willkie won.

In the end, the sixth
The Taft organization

could not match the public relations blitz of the Willkie forces.

In

addition, the Senator was not able to keep the Old Guard in line.

The

war in Europe brought uncertainty to the United States, and many of
the delegates were uncertain that isolationism, or a mild form of it,
was the answer in 1940.
Eight years were to pass before Robert Taft's second defeat.
world had changed greatly in the interim.

The

Americans had fought and won

the second world war, and the Republican Party gained control of Congress
in 1946.

Many of the liberal social programs of the Roosevelt and

Truman administrations were taken for granted by the American people.
Isolationism in its purest form died with the beginning of the War.
Taft's stature among conservative elements increased in the war
years, and when the G. 0. P. gained control of the Senate he was the
de facto leader of the Party.
suspicious of the Senator.

Easterners and liberals were still

They had come to the conclusion that the
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Republican Party could win the presidency only by offering New Deal
type legislation which would cost less and be run more effectively.
They also formed key elements in the bi-partisan foreign policy worked
out by Senator Vandenberg and President Truman.
Though Taft was the author of liberal housing and education
legislation, he was not willing to accept the New Deal and Fair Deal.
These programs were too costly, and they had the effect of taking rights
away from individuals.

He therefore based his 1948 campaign on a

return to values which predated the Roosevelt administration.
As in 1940, many organization Republicans came to his support.
The powerful Republicans of the East rallied to the support of Thomas
E. Dewey of New York.

Dewey was also able to win considerable support

from farmers, when Taft made a blunder by calling for cuts in farm
support prices.
Though Taft had considerable strength at the convention, it is
difficult to see how he could have won.

The blunders of the campaign,

and poor performances in the Nebraska and Ohio primaries, showed that
his strength lay with the organization Republicans, rather than the
voters.

Dewey was nominated with little difficulty on the third ballot.

Taft’s final attempt to gain the Republican nomination came in
1952.

Until the appearance of Eisenhower, he was considered a leading

candidate.

Conservatives rallied to his cause.

still hostile.
ambiguous.

But the liberals were

They believed Taft’s foreign policy position to be

Many of them still felt, that despite Dewey’s defeat in

1948, the way to power for the Republican Party lay through outpromising the Democrats.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

141
Taft still held his conservative view that the Party must offer
an alternative to the voters.

Government spending had to be cut, and

individual freedom had to be protected.
As in previous campaigns, Taft made few converts.
agreed with him were loyal to the end.
of the Republican Party.

Those who

They made up a large portion

But when Dewey and his liberal colleagues

found General Eisenhower, they found a candidate with personality—
and personality won out in the end.
Taft had also to contend with new Republican leadership in the
South.

Many southerners wanted a real two party system in their section

of the country.

The club-like organizations of Republicans were not

conducive to growth of the Party.

New leaders came along in 1952,

and the Old Guard began to relinquish control.

The struggle in the

South gave Eisenhower and his supporters the issue which eventually
tipped the balance at the Chicago convention.
Continuity exists throughout the twelve years during which Robert
Taft sought to be President.

His isolationist position in 1940 caused

him to be distrusted by strong elements within the Party and though
he was able to enhance his position in the Senate, he was never able to
overcome their distrust.

He was opposed by Eastern Republicans

throughout his attempt to win the nomination.

He could not match the

magnetism of Willkie or Eisenhower, and the Eastern press constantly
showed him in poor light.

The Senator's organization remained, with

few exceptions, the same throughout the quest.

The organization worked

well before the conventions, but for some reason became inept on the
convention floor.

Time and time again, communications broke down,
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and Taft's cause suffered.
While press, personality, and organization were contributing
factors to Taft's lack of success, they are not the most important
factors.
The overriding reason for Taft's failure in presidential politics
was his slowness to change his mind on the issues, or at least the
perception of others that he would not change his mind.

He was the most

articulate spokesman for a large faction of the Party, and he hoped to
gain the nomination through the support of his wing of the Party.
The difficulty was that the Taft wing of the Party was never broad
based enough to control a nominating convention.

Twice, in 1940,

and in 1952, he almost attained a majority of delegates.

Had he been

less honest, and more of a politician, he might have compromised on
issues enough to win.

But he is to be admired for keeping his integrity.

In the final analysis, Robert Taft holds a position in American
political history similar to that held by his colleagues in the Senate
Hall of Fame begun in 1957.

Like John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay, Daniel

Webster, and Robert LaFollette, Robert A. Taft was the leader of a large
faction within his party— a faction which embraced a considerable body
of political knowledge.

His faction had the support of many Americans.

But at the time he was politically active his faction never controlled
the Republican Party.

The lack of control made his quest for the

presidency fruitless.

His refusal to compromise with integrity prevented

him from widening his base of support, and thus prevented him from
becoming President of the United States.
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